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I. INTRODUCTION
Following the events of September 11, 2001, Ekaterine Bautista en-
listed in the U.S. Army, like many living in the United States' Bautista
was born in Morelia, Mexico and was brought illegally to the United
States as a child.2 As an undocumented immigrant, Bautista was barred
from enlisting in the U.S. military, so with her U.S. citizen aunt's permis-
sion, Bautista assumed her aunt's name, Rosalia Guerra Morelos, as well
as her driver's license, birth certificate, and Social Security number.3 Her
actions were an attempt to protect her daughter, "because it was the right
thing to do."4
Bautista went on to serve thirteen months in Baqubah, Iraq, where she
received the Combat Action Badge for exposure to enemy fire.s The
only obstacle she faced regarding naturalization was that she enlisted us-
ing her aunt's name, driver's license, birth certificate, and Social Security
number.' Her crimes of fraudulent enlistment and altering identity docu-
ments were enough to put her application for citizenship in jeopardy, de-
spite the magnitude of the service that she had given her adopted nation.'
Her pending naturalization ceremony was halted when her fraudulent ac-
tions were discovered in 2010.8
The latter of her offenses are categorized as aggravated felonies for
naturalization purposes even though they do not involve acts of violence
or use of weapons.' Acts with this designation are statutory permanent
bars to citizenship because their presence in an applicant's record pre-
vents a finding of good moral character, one of the requirements for
naturalization.' 0
Consider also the story of Private First Class (PFC) Diego Rincon, who
served in the U.S. Army, and was killed on March 29, 2004 by a suicide
bomber in Iraq." His family brought him to the United States when he
was five years old and he was less than two years out of high school when
1. Anna Gorman, Iraq War Veteran May be Denied Citizenship, L.A. TIMes, Apr. 26,
2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/apr/26/local/la-me-immig-army-20100426.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Anna Gorman, Iraq War Veteran May be Denied Citizenship, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 26,
2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/apr/26/local/la-me-immig-army-20100426.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(P) (2006).
10. Id. § 1101(f)(8).
11. Janice Johnston & Bill Redeker, Immigrant U.S. Soldier Granted Posthumous Citi-
zenship, ABC: GooD MORNING AMERICA, Apr. 8, 2004, at Al.
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he was killed.12 His brother, Fabian, summarized PFC Rincon's reasons
for serving his adopted country by saying: "They're out there fighting for
their country, their country that they love." They were not born in it, but
they feel so much a part of it that it's like [if] they were born here. That's
how I take it and that's how my brother saw it also."1 4
Whether driven by the desire for citizenship or to give back to the na-
tion, these patriotic "Americans-by-choice" come from every corner of
the globe to serve in our armed forces." Foreign-born U.S. service mem-
bers killed in Iraq hailed from Nigeria, China, India, Scotland, Mexico,
the Dominican Republic, and Guatemala." But as the sister of one fallen
soldier pointed out, "He can't take the oath [of citizenship] from the
coffin . . . .""
Over 31,000 non-U.S. citizens currently serve in the U.S. Armed Ser-
vices.18 One reason that the military service of immigrants is becoming
more significant is that natural-born citizens are not qualified to serve.
According to Pentagon statistics, over one-third of Americans aged sev-
enteen to twenty-four are unqualified because of physical and medical
issues," eighteen percent are disqualified because of illegal drugs, ten
percent are disqualified because of a lack of mental capacity, and five
percent because of their criminal record.20 Being of good moral charac-
ter is a requirement for both the military and citizenship naturalization,
but the presence of prior crimes in a legal permanent resident's back-
ground can preclude that applicant from ever gaining citizenship even
though those same crimes are not serious enough to prevent enlistment in
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Helen O'Neill, Families Conflicted on Posthumous Citizenship, ARMY Times,
(Mar. 24, 2008, 10:50:14 AM), http://www.armytimes.com/news/2008/03/ap citizenship-032
408/.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Johnston & Redeker, supra note 11.
19. William H. McMichael, Most U.S. Youths Unfit to Serve, Data Show, ARMY
TIMES, (Nov. 3, 2009, 5:08:36 PM), http://www.armytimes.com/news/2009/11/military-unfit
youthsjrecruiting_1 10309wl.
20. Id.
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the military.2 Fighting for an adopted nation is not a recent develop-
ment and has often been portrayed in literature and film.2 2
While the membership conferred upon undocumented immigrants may
not be formal, there is a definite sense of social acceptance and inclusion
into the community that accompanies serving in the armed forces.2 3 In
Greece, for example, one famous foreign fighter-and celebrated English
Romantic poet-is even elevated to the level of a national hero.24
However, in the United States the status of these men and women is
less celebrated. It may come as a surprise that Indian born U.S. Army
Specialist Uday Singh, age twenty-one, was the first Sikh to die in combat
in the U.S. military, and is also the first Sikh to be buried at Arlington
Cemetery." It may also be surprising to learn that foreign-born combat
veterans, like Ekaterina Bautista, are labeled as 'aggravated felons' for
crimes that do not involve violence, the use of a weapon, or even a formal
conviction in a court of law.26 This label functions as a permanent bar to
21. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f) (2008) (listing the bars to a finding for good moral character
in naturalization applicants); see also Enlisted Soldiers: The Heart of the Army, Go ARMY,
http://www.goarmy.com/about/service-options/enlisted-soldiers-and-officers/enlisted-sol-
dier.html (last visited Dec. 23,2012) ("Requirements-To become an Enlisted Soldier in the
U.S. Army, you must be: A U.S. citizen or permanent resident alien, 17-35 years old,
healthy and in good physical condition, in good moral standing, and have a high school
diploma or equivalent. Note that some Army jobs may have additional qualifications").
22. See LAFAYETTE EsCADRILLE (Warner Bros. Pictures 1958) (portraying young
Americans flying for the French Foreign Legion in World War I); ERNESTr HEMINGWAY,
FOR WHOM TiE BEiL ToL s (Charles Scribners' Sons 1940) (recounting the exploits of a
fictional American fighting in the Spanish Civil War. This story is based on many of the
men Hemingway encountered when he was in Spain covering the war as a journalist.);
ERNESTO CHE GUEVARA, RIEMINISCENCES OF THF CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY WAR (Ocean
Press 2005) (transcribing his experiences as a Cuban revolutionary. Che Guevara is argua-
bly one of the most famous expatriate fighters and certainly one of the most
romanticized.).
23. Fotis Kapetopoulos, Lord Byron: A Man of His Time, NEOSKOSMOs (Sept. 15,
2009), http://neoskosmos.com/news/en/Lord-Byron-man-of-his-time.
24. Id.
Lord Byron is a hero to modern Greeks as the most influential westerner to support
the Greek war of Independence against the Ottoman Turks in 1821. Byron put his
money and body on the line for the Greek Nationalist Revolution, dying on the way to
battle the Turk. Byron was a complex man with a complex life. He played an impor-
tant role in the formation of the modern Greek identity and in the development of
Western values in the Hellenic imagination.
Id.
25. O'Neill, supra note 15.
26. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2006).
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citizenship by precluding a finding of good moral character by an immi-
gration judge.2 7
The good moral character requirement is one of several which apply to
all applicants for citizenship. There are differing residency requirements
depending on whether the applicant is a civilian, a military member, or a
combat veteran, but the periods during which good moral character must
be established are the same at five years." All applicants are required to
show attachment to the principles of the Constitution, a working knowl-
edge of the English language, and be well disposed to the good order and
happiness of the United States, and be eighteen years old or older.2 9
Not everyone is united in the view that foreign service-members should
receive citizenship for serving in the military."o Some family members
state that their deceased loved ones did not want American citizenship
and that it is better for them to keep the nationality of their mother-
27. SEJAL ZOTA & JOHN RuIN, IMMIGRATION CONSEOUENCES MANUAL, UNC
Scuooi ori Gov'r 43 (2008).
28. See 8 U.S.C. § 1439 (2006); 8 U.S.C. § 1440 (2006); 8 U.S.C. § 1427 (2006) (stating
the residency requirement for civilians is five years, for military service members is three
years, and no residency requirement for combat veterans).
29. Immigration Nationality Act § 312, 8 U.S.C. § 1423 (2005); see Immigration Na-
tionality Act § 316, 8 U.S.C. § 1427 (2006); Immigration Nationality Act § 337a, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1448 (2000) (listing the statutory elements of the oath of citizenship); C.F.R. § 337.1 (cov-
ering the oath of citizenship). The oath states:
I hereby declare, on oath, that I absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all alle-
giance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty, of whom or
which I have heretofore been a subject or citizen; that I will support and defend the
Constitution and laws of the United States of America against all enemies, foreign and
domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I will bear arms on
behalf of the United States when required by the law; that I will perform noncomba-
tant service in the Armed Forces of the United States when required by the law; that I
will perform work of national importance under civilian direction when required by
the law; and that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or pur-
pose of evasion; so help me God.
Id.
30. O'Neill, supra note 15. The right to become an American is not automatic for
those who die in combat. Id. Families must formally apply for citizenship within two years
of the soldier's death, and not all choose to do so. Id.
'He's Italian-better to leave it like that,' Saveria Romeo said of her 23-year-old son,
Army Staff Sgt. Vincenzo Romeo, who was born in Calabria, died in Iraq and is buried
in New Jersey. A miniature Italian flag marks his grave, next to an American one.
'What good would it do?' she said. 'It won't bring back my son.' But it would allow
her to apply for citizenship for herself, a benefit only recently offered to surviving
parents and spouses. Until 2003, posthumous citizenship was granted only through an
act of Congress and was purely symbolic. There were no benefits for next of kin.
Romeo said she has no desire to apply. She couldn't bear to benefit in any way from
her son's death, she said. And besides, she feels Italian, not American.
Id.
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land." While some foreign-born service-members may not want to repu-
diate their citizenship status in their homeland, the literally tens of
thousands who have naturalized after service in Iraq and Afghanistan3 2
prove that American citizenship is highly valuable to foreign-born service
members and that this issue warrants further discourse.
The purpose of this essay is to explore the harsh consequences of the
good moral character requirement and the expansion of the term "aggra-
vated felony" as it impacts veterans. Part I examines the history of the
good moral character requirement in the immigration context, the history
of military naturalization, and the nexus between the two. Next, Part II
considers why these people are willing to fight for our country and two
circumstances under which past conduct can exclude them from citizen-
ship. In Part III the "aggravated felony" term of art and its detriments on
due process rights are discussed at length in the naturalization context.
Part IV covers the Good Moral Character requirement and how it could
benefit from incorporating a balancing test based on the former INA Sec-
tion 212(c) balancing test. Finally, Parts V and VI examine the positive
factors from the Board of Immigration Appeals Decision Matter of Marin
and the need for a new framework to consider the positive acts of
applicants.
II. MILITARY NATURALIZATION AND GOOD MORAL CHARACTER-
A SHORT HISTORY
From September 2001 through the end of fiscal year 2011, the United
States Citizenship and Immigration Service reported that it naturalized
almost 75,000 members of the military with almost 10,000 of their natural-
ization ceremonies taking place outside the United States. This govern-
ment body is the central bureaucracy controlling who gets to become an
American citizen.34 This illustrates that military naturalization is even
more prevalent today. It also illustrates the incredible amount of per-
sonal sacrifice being displayed by these proud service members in order
to join our nation as full citizens. 5 The history of this path to citizenship
31. Id.
32. NATURALIZATION THROUGH MILITARY SERvIcE: FAcT Sui-Er, UNITED STATES
CUSToMS AND IMMIGRATION SERVICE (2011), available at http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/
uscis/menuitem (follow "Citizenship for Military Personnel & Family Members" hyperlink;
then "Naturalization Through Military Service: Fact Sheet" hyperlink).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Furthermore, the sacrifice military members make affords them the opportunity
to "obtain an education, a better job, and helpi] boost the economy every year." See
generally, Whitney Howe, Public or Private University? New Legislation Caps Veterans'
Educational Choices That Could Cost Less, 14 SCHOLAR 1075 (2012) (discussing the educa-
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is surprisingly long in our nation as is the history of its most enigmatic
requirement: demonstrating good moral character.
A. Good Moral Character
The rule requiring applicants for naturalization to show good moral
character dates back to 1790.36 Since that time, the application of the
rule has changed dramatically as well as the length of time that an appli-
cant must demonstrate such character. The historical reason behind the
rule is simple: Congress wanted to ensure that persons seeking citizenship
possessed the character to make good citizens." In principle, this sounds
like a great idea, but the problem lies in its application. Dubiously, this
standard is plagued by subjectivity.38 While one might expect that the
standard would have been liberalized over time, like many other areas of
the law, this area is marked by a steady increase in restrictions on appli-
cants for citizenship.
Starting in the 1990's, Congress has continually classified an alarming
number of non-violent criminal acts as being a statutory bar to a finding
of good moral character.3 9 The result is that applicants with such pre-
cluded behavior anywhere in their background are permanently barred
from meeting the good moral character requirement and subsequently
from ever attaining citizenship.40 However, the full history of this re-
quirement illustrates that jurisprudence surrounding the good moral
character requirement has shifted from a non-punitive and flexible ap-
proach to one littered with permanent bars to citizenship.4 1
tion benefits available to U.S. military veterans who participate in the various G.I. Bill
programs).
36. Kevin Lapp, Reforming the Good Moral Character Requirement for U.S. Citizen-
ship, 87 INo. L.J. 1571, 1572 (2012).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.; see 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(43) (2006) (including as permanent bars to citizenship
acts like fraud, money laundering in excess of $10,000, tax evasion in excess of $10,000,
altering identity documents, theft offenses, racketeering, and some gambling related of-
fenses, failure to appear for a felony charge, two kinds of bribery, perjury, obstruction of
justice, counterfeiting); see also Michael Kent Herring, A Soldier's Road to U.S. Citizen-
ship-Is A Conviction A Speed Bump or A Stop Sign?, ARMY LAw., June 2004, at 20, 30
(explaining that clients must be carefully advised when in doubt about the outcome of their
criminal cases because a conviction may result in removal from the United States).
40. Major Michael Kent Herring, A Soldier's Road to U.S. Citizenship-Is A Conviction
A Speed Bump or A Stop Sign?, ARMY LAw., June 2004, at 20, 30.
41. Lapp, supra note 36.
For over 150 years, Congress offered no guidance whatsoever on what constituted
good moral character in the naturalization context. In the absence of a statutory defi-
nition, courts developed a flexible, forward-looking standard for evaluating good
moral character that did not mean to punish for past conduct but instead contem-
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In addition, the inclusion in the Immigration and Naturalization Act of
a catchall provision allows courts to lump together several acts to pre-
clude a finding of good moral character when those acts, considered
alone, would not support such a finding.42 When considered in the con-
text of military naturalization, the clear effect upon the service-member/
veteran applicant is increased uncertainty whether the application will be
accepted. Many factors drive these brave men and women to serve the
United States, although no certainty lies in their ability to obtain citizen-
ship. Despite the uncertainty regarding naturalization and the inevitabil-
ity of being deployed to a war zone and its physical dangers since 2001,
almost 75,000 service-members have realized their dream of citizenship
by using this path.4 3 Can we really continue to encourage this practice
without giving these brave men and women a fair and workable path to
becoming American citizens?
The process for making new citizens possesses a long history in our
nation. The Act of March 26, 1790 required that an applicant for citizen-
ship prove two years residency, a showing of good character and was only
available to free white persons.44 By 1795, Congress added 'moral' to the
good character formulation and raised the residency requirement to five
years.4 5 In 1802, the requirements were amended to include a declaration
of intent to apply for citizenship three years before admission could be
granted.4 6 The applicant was also required to denounce all foreign sover-
eigns and all noble titles in addition to making an oath to the U.S. Consti-
tution.4 7 The five-year residency requirement is still present today in
INA Section 316(a).48
plated prior transgressions and recognized the potential for reform . . . . Since 1990,
Congress has added hundreds of permanent, irrebuttable statutory bars to a good
moral character finding triggered by criminal conduct. Where no statutory bar ap-
plies, naturalization examiners may still deny an applicant on character grounds in
their discretion. The effect of these statutory changes and agency practices is the crea-
tion of bars to citizenship not found in the statute, subverting the statutory and regula-
tory scheme governing naturalization.
Id.
42. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (f)(9) (2006).
43. NATURALIZATION THROUGH MILITARY SRVIcE: FACE SHEinE; supra note 32.
44. Darlene C. Goring, In Service to America: Naturalization of Undocumented Alien
Veterans, 31 SETON HALL L. Ri-v. 400, 408-09 (2000).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 410.
47. Id.
48. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 316(a), 66 Stat.
242.
No person, except as otherwise provided in this title, shall be naturalized, unless such
applicant, ... immediately preceding the date of filing his application for naturaliza-
tion has resided continuously, after being lawfully admitted for permanent residence,
610 [Vol. 15:603
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The first case to define good moral character came in 1878.49 The fed-
eral court in In re Spenser opined, "probably the average man of the
country is as high as it can be set."50 This case involved a man who was
previously convicted of perjury and then pardoned.s' The court further
reasoned that the governor's pardon had no probative value in the analy-
sis of Spenser's good moral character.5 2 The court concluded that the
pardon only worked to erase an individual's guilt and kept the bad act in
the good moral character analysis by noting, "the past is not
obliterated.""
This case also reinforced the principle that a court could not consider
bad acts outside the statutory residence period.5 4 This allows for a person
to redeem their prior bad acts, from a naturalization standpoint, by main-
taining a record of good behavior for the required statutory period of
residence. In his article, Reforming the Good Moral Character Require-
ment, Kevin Lapp recalls that even a convicted murderer could establish a
period of good moral character according to a 1944 Immigration and Na-
tionality Service manual for employees and this idea still lingers today."
His article contrasts the liberal attitude towards prior criminal acts found
in the judicial system and other governmental bodies to the increasingly
restrictive legislation passed by Congress. 6
In Lapp's thinking, the greatest assault on veteran's rights came in the
form of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 and the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996.1' These two pieces of
legislation incorporated the term 'aggravated felony' into the naturaliza-
within the United States for at least five years and during the five years immediately
preceding the date of filing his application has been physically present therein for
periods totaling at least half of that time.
Id.
49. Lapp, supra note 36, at 1586.
50. 22 F. Cas. 921, 921 (C.C.D. Or. 1878).
51. In re Spenser, 22 F. Cas. at 921.
52. Id. at 922.
53. Id. at 923.
54. Id. at 921.
55. Lapp, supra note 36, at 1588. Compare Lawson v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration
Services, 795 F. Supp. 2d 283, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding that Vietnam Marine Corps
veteran born in Jamaica was able to establish good moral character despite having been
convicted of manslaughter for killing his wife during an argument in 1985, problems with
drug and alcohol addiction, and serving thirteen years in prison-all of which happened
after his military service), with Castiglia v. Immigration and Naturalization Services, 108
F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 1997) (denying application for naturalization of Vietnam War
veteran from Italy based on presence of 2nd degree murder conviction from twenty-three
years prior-which happened after his honorable military service).
56. Lapp, supra note 36, at 1588.
57. Id. at 1590-91.
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tion analysis.ss The latter act greatly expanded the kinds of bad acts that
could be included under the 'aggravated felony' misnomer.59 In fact
Lapp bemoans the horrid state of affairs for immigrants:
That is not to say, however, that an aggravated felony for immigra-
tion purposes necessarily correlates to a conviction for a serious or
violent crime. Indeed, it does not even guarantee that the person
was convicted of a felony. A person with only misdemeanor convic-
tions can be considered an aggravated felon. As just one example of
many, misdemeanor theft of a videogame valued at approximately
ten dollars can make someone an aggravated felon for immigration
purposes. Further, the INA's broad definition of conviction captures
criminal cases that result in deferred adjudications and suspended
sentences via rehabilitative statutes that later erase the record of
guilt . . . This makes it possible for someone without a criminal re-
cord to be considered an aggravated felon for immigration
purposes. 0
Finally, the INA contains a catchall provision codified in 8 U.S.C. Sec-
tion 1101(f), which allows a finding of no good moral character, notwith-
standing the fact that the applicant does not fit any of the statutory
58. See Pub. L.No. 100-490, 102 Stat. 4181 (codified in scattered titles and sections of
U.S.C.); see also Lapp, supra note 36, at 1590-91 (describing how Congress has expanded
the definition of aggravated felony: "Two years later, however, Congress broadened the
reach of 'aggravated felony' in two important ways. First, it expanded the definition of
'aggravated felony' to include any 'crime of violence' for which the person was sentenced
to greater than five years and 'any illicit trafficking in any controlled substance.' Second, it
added a provision that barred anyone convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after
passage of the act from ever establishing good moral character. This eliminated an individ-
ual inquiry for any naturalization applicant convicted of an aggravated felony after Novem-
ber 29, 1990, substituting a per se conclusion regarding the applicant's moral character that
survived indefinitely.")
Id. See Abbe Kingston, Aggravated Felonies-Harsh Consequences, KMH IMMIG;RA'ION,
http://www.kmhimmigration.com/aggravated-felonies.html (last visited Dec. 24, 2012) ("As
with AEDPA, [1lRIRAJ made a significant expansion of the aggravated felony definition.
Section 101(a)(43) INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(43), which began as one paragraph in 1988,
now contains 21 paragraphs with many subparagraphs. With the expansion of the defini-
tion of aggravated felony under IIRIRA, some 50 general classes of crime are currently
specifically enumerated. Today, practice under IIRIRA requires a very close analysis of
the criminal charges because seemingly all convictions considered felonies under federal
law will qualify as aggravated felonies. Moreover, because recent statutory changes apply
retroactively to offenses committed decades ago (that may even have been misdemeanors),
past offenses may now be grounds for removal from the U.S. as aggravated felonies.")
Id.
59. Lapp, supra note 36, at 1590-91.
60. Id. at 1592.
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prohibitions. 6' Lapp goes on to specifically discuss how USCIS employs
this provision to frustrate the naturalization for large numbers of appli-
cants even today.62
In essence, the jurisprudence on good moral character has shifted com-
pletely away from the notion of rehabilitation and allowing applicants to
justify their case for citizenship. Congress has replaced this idea with a
regimen of permanent statutory bars for behavior not necessarily
amounting to a conviction and a framework for linking other bad acts
together under the catchall provision to deny citizenship." The effects of
this system create a discrete group of unrepresented people who are un-
justly denied many abilities or motivations to take part in the political
process or the community.64 In the context of military naturalization, it is
very unjust that a service member who makes the ultimate sacrifice while
deployed can receive posthumous citizenship in spite of any bad acts in
their past,' but a living service member who is fortunate enough to com-
plete his or her service honorably could still be barred for non-violent
past acts.66
B. Military Naturalization
The first significant piece of American legislation addressing the natu-
ralization of service members was the Alien Soldiers Naturalization Act
61. See 8 USC § 1101(f) (2006) ("The fact that any person is not within any of the
foregoing classes shall not preclude a finding that for other reasons such person is or was
not of good moral character.").
62. Lapp, supra note 36, at 1590-91.
63. See 8 USC § 1101(f) (2006) ("The fact that any person is not within any of the
foregoing classes shall not preclude a finding that for other reasons such person is or was
not of good moral character.").
64. Lapp, supra note 36, at 1621.
The good moral character bar to naturalization accomplishes the same as felon disen-
franchisement: silencing the political voice of those who have committed crimes. Yet
it suffers the same critique as felon disenfranchisement. Foreclosing access to full po-
litical rights frustrates social cohesion, and it does not sustain justification under any of
the four classical justifications for punishment. A blanket bar to a good moral charac-
ter finding based on a list of crimes that varies from the most serious to the petty is not
proportional. Since the consequence of criminal behavior by noncitizens is increas-
ingly deportation, a collateral bar to citizenship cannot be said (and most certainly has
not been proven) to provide any additional deterrence to crime. The bar does not
manage risk because the people are not physically excluded but continue to live and
work in the community. It does, however, frustrate rehabilitation by labeling these
individuals as incorrigible outsiders.
Id.
65. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 329(a), 66 Stat. 25 (1952).
66. See 8 USC § 1101(a)(43) (2006) (defining "aggravated felony").
2013] 613
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of 1862.67 This Act encouraged foreigners to join the Union Army during
the Civil War by streamlining the requirements for citizenship.68 This leg-
islation is one of the first embodiments in American legal history of the
principle that service during a time of war confers membership in our
community and that the requirements for citizenship should be less strin-
gent for service members." Specifically, the Act required no previous
declaration of intent, only one year's residence, and an honorable
discharge.7 0
Interestingly, this Act only applied to the U.S. Army.' One English-
man tested the Act in In Re Bailey72 in 1872 when he was denied citizen-
ship after his services in the Civil War with the U.S. Marine Corps." By
67. Goring, supra note 44, at 410-11.
68. Id. at 411.
69. Id. "This Act was the first in a series of statutes to offer expedited naturalization
to aliens who agreed to defend the Union in its war against the Southern states."
That any alien, of the age of twenty-one years and upwards, who has enlisted or shall
enlist in the armies of the United States, either the regular or the volunteer forces, and
has been or shall be hereafter honorably discharged, may be admitted to become a
citizen of the United States, upon his petition, without any previous declaration of his
intention to become a citizen of the United States, and that he shall not be required to
prove a more than one year's residence within the United States previous to his appli-
cation to become such citizen; and that the court admitting such alien shall, in addition
to such proof of residence and good moral character as is now provided by law, be
satisfied by competent proof of such person having been honorably discharged from
the service of the United States as aforesaid.
Id.
70.That any alien, of the age of twenty-one years and upwards, who has enlisted or
shall enlist in the armies of the United States, either the regular or the volunteer
forces, and has been or shall be hereafter honorably discharged, may be admitted to
become a citizen of the United States, upon his petition, without any previous declara-
tion of his intention to become a citizen of the United States, and that he shall not be
required to prove a more than one year's residence within the United States previous
to his application to become such citizen; and that the court admitting such alien shall,
in addition to such proof of residence and good moral character as is now provided by
law, be satisfied by competent proof of such person having been honorably discharged
from the service of the United States as aforesaid.
Id.
71. See Alien Soldiers Naturalization Act, Rev. Stat. of 1878 § 2166; Goring, supra
note 44, at 411-12 ("In the case of In re Bailey, the court noted that Revised Statute § 2166
explicitly applied to alien veterans of the U.S. Army.").
72. 2 F.CAS. 360, 362 (D. Or 1872).
73. Id.
The term army or armies has never been used by congress, so far as I am advised, so as
to include the navy or marines, and there is nothing in the act of 1862, or the circum-
stances which led to its passage, to warrant the conclusion that it was used therein in
any other than its long established and ordinary sense-the land force, as distin-
guished from the navy and marines.
Id.
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1894, Congress extended naturalization privileges to include members of
the Navy and Marine Corps,74 requiring them serve at least four years by
1914.7 However, the requirements were still more stringent than the
Army, showing the more stringent attitude of Congress towards military
naturalization during times of peace."
The next period during which naturalization requirements were eased
came during the First World War. Aliens residing in the United States
who where forced into military service were rewarded in 1918 with an
amendment to section Four of the Uniform Naturalization Act of 1906."
This amendment exempted service-members both from providing proof
of five years residence as well as making a prior declaration of intent to
naturalize." Additionally, the expansion of the privilege to Filipinos and
Puerto Ricans with three years of service, notwithstanding wartime sta-
tus, reflected an upswing in the liberal attitude toward granting citizen-
ship to foreign service-members.7 9 However, even though Congress saw
74. See Goring, supra note 44, at 412 ("Two decades after Bailey, Congress adopted
the Act of July 26,1894." This Act addressed the problem in Bailey by expanding the alien
naturalization privileges established in Revised Statute § 2166. The Act applied the privi-
lege to "any alien who has enlisted or may enlist in the United States Navy or Marine
Corps."); see also Act of Mar. 2, 1837, ch. 21, 5 Stat. 153 ("[lIt shall be lawful to enlist other
persons for the navy, to serve for a period not exceeding five years, unless sooner dis-
charged by the direction of the President of the United States."); Act of Mar. 3, 1809, ch.
33, 2 Stat. 544 (authorizing an augmentation of the Marine Corps).
75. Goring, supra note 44, at 412.
76. Id. at 411.
77. See id. at 414 (rewarding though amending the requirements).
78. See id. (providing a more accessible naturalization system through a "new provi-
sion of section four [which] provided that WWI alien veterans were not required to submit
a 'preliminary declaration of intention' or "proof of the required five years" residence in
the United States.").
79. Id. at 414-15. The Acts' amendments allowed for Filipinos, Puerto Ricans and
Native Americans to serve and be rewarded by the federal government:
Any native-born Filipino of the age of twenty-one years and upward who has declared
his intention to become a citizen of the United States and who has enlisted or may
hereafter enlist in the United States Navy or Marine Corps or the Naval Auxiliary
Service, and who, after service of not less than three years, may be honorably dis-
charged therefrom, or who may receive an ordinary discharge with recommendation
for reenlistment; or any alien, or any Porto [ [sic] Rican not a citizen of the United
States, of the age of twenty-one years and upward, who has enlisted or entered or may
hereafter enlist in or enter the armies of the United States ... or in the United States
Navy or Marine Corps, or in the United States Coast Guard .. . may, on presentation
of the required declaration of intention petition for naturalization without proof of the
required five years' residence in the United States.
Id.
That every American Indian who served in the Military or Naval Establishments of
the United States during the war against the Imperial German Government, and who
has received or who shall hereafter receive an honorable discharge, if not now a citi-
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fit to confer citizenship on its soldiers and service-members, it did not
hesitate to punish those who failed to answer the call."o
The time period between the First and Second World War saw the first
permanent statutory bars to citizenship for previous crimes or acts.81
These prohibitions were carved out of the Act of 1917, which created an
even greater number of permanent statutory bars to citizenship for the
general pool of applicants.82 Under these provisions of the 1926 Act, vet-
eran status counted for nothing if the applicant was ridden with a conta-
gious disease, a polygamist, a prostitute, a contract laborer, a previous
deportee, or convicted of a crime.8 Additionally, residency and charac-
ter requirements were once again imposed on alien veterans for the first
time since the Civil War.84 Thus, the inter-war years experienced the
same Congressional constriction of the requirements for citizenship ex-
perienced between the Civil War and the First World War.s
zen and if he so desires, shall, on proof of such discharge and after proper identifica-
tion before a court of competent jurisdiction, and without other examination except as
prescribed by said court, be granted full citizenship .
Id. at 415 n.62.
80. See In re Gnadt, 269 F. 189 (E.D. Mo. 1920) (holding that the application of an
alien who had enlisted into the Army and then deserted therefrom and been found guilty
in a court-martial and sentenced to a dishonorable discharge and one year hard labor was
denied with prejudice); Jubran v. United States, 255 F.2d 81, 84 (5th Cir. 1958) (holding
that Palestinian applicant was barred from citizenship because of his election to take ex-
emption from military service); Petition of Velasquez, 139 F. Supp. 790, 792 (S.D.N.Y.
1956); Petition of Skender, 248 F.2d 92, 95 (2d Cir. 1957) (rejecting the application for
citizenship of an Iraqi national who applied for exemption from military service during
World War II); see also In re Schrape, 217 F. 142, 145 (W.D. Wash. 1914) (denying the
petition of a sailor who served in the revenue cutter service for four years but did not
intend to reenlist).
81. These bars were present in the Act of 1926 and from the 1917 Congress' intent to
restrict naturalization for certain veterans. See Goring, supra note 44, at 416 (explaining
the process of the adoption of restrictions of naturalization for veterans).
82. See Goring, supra note 44, at 416 (alluding to the restrictions based on health and
potentially being a public charge to the country).
83. See id. (listing the various bars of inadmissibility for veterans); see also Act of May
26, 1926, Pub. L. No. 294, ch. 398, 44 Stat. 654-55 (describing these veterans as "nonquota
immigrants").
'[N]onquota immigrant[s]' which meant that they were not subject to the numerical
quota limitations set forth in the Immigration Act of 1924. This classification as a
nonquota immigrant insured that the alien veteran, upon satisfaction of the require-
ments for admissibility and proof of eligibility for an immigrant visa, would not be
required to wait before an immigration visa was issued.
Goring, supra note 44, at 416 n.69.
84. See Goring, supra note 44, at 417 (explaining that "the Act of May 25, 1932 rein-
stated the residency and morality requirements that had not been imposed on alien veter-
ans since 1862.").
85. Id.
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However, the need for manpower during the Second World War
quickly increased the value of military service again, and by 1942, Con-
gress substantially relaxed the requirements. Under the amendments
passed in that year, a military applicant was not required to show resi-
dency, age, English language proficiency, or literacy, and most notably,
the racial restrictions present since the Civil War were inapplicable.8 7
Oddly, these applicants were still required to submit affidavits of two
U.S. citizens confirming their good moral character.8  By 1952, Congress
repealed the earlier Act of 1940 and replaced it with another Act, greatly
increasing the number of veterans eligible for naturalization through the
86. Congress amended the 1940 Act to adjust for the need of military personnel to
make the process of naturalization more accessible for soldiers. See Goring, supra note 44,
at 419-20 (recognizing the need to award military personnel for their service). Congress
also enacted the first G.I Bill in 1944 in order to make education more accessible for veter-
ans returning from World War II. Whitney Howe, Comment, Public or Private University?
New Legislation Caps Veterans' Educational Choices That Could Cost Less, 14 ScIo101
1075, 1083 (2012).
87. Petition of Delgado, 57 F. Supp. 460, 462 (N.D. Cal. 1944).
It was clearly the intent of Congress in adopting Sec. 701 to follow the historic course
of granting the boon of citizenship to loyal aliens engaging to help defend this country.
The House Committee reporting H.R. 1710 (which became Sec. 701) said: 'It is a mat-
ter of historic record that the Government of the United States, as an encouragement
to loyal aliens engaged in the defense of this country through service in the armed
forces, has in past years, relieved them from some of the burdensome requirements of
the general naturalization laws' House Misc. Rep. 10661, page 3. And again in the
same report, it is stated: 'This proposed legislation proceeds upon the principle that
non-citizens who are ready and willing to sacrifice their lives in the maintenance of
this democratic government are deserving of the high gift of United States citizenship
when vouched for by responsible witnesses as loyal and of good character and shown
by government records as serving honorably'
Id.; see also Goring, supra note 44, at 420 (stating "In fact, Congress needed so desperately
to increase the number of enlisted personnel in the Armed Forces that in 1942 it added
Title III, sections 701 through 705, to the Nationality Act of 1940. By doing so, it provided
a statutory framework to almost immediately naturalize aliens serving in WWII. Section
701 of Title III of the 1940 Act, as amended, provided that any alien enlistee who honora-
bly served in the military or naval forces during WWII was eligible for naturalization re-
gardless of age, satisfaction of residency requirements, English language proficiency, or
literacy requirements. An alien veteran of WWII was, however, required to be 'lawfully
admitted to the United States, including its Territories and possessions' at the time of en-
listment or induction, and was required to submit affidavits from two credible United
States citizens that he was known as 'a person of good moral character, attached to the
principles of the Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to the good order and
happiness of the United States.' Racial restrictions to naturalization found in Section 303
of the 1940 Act did not apply to those aliens who qualified under Section 701.")
88. See Goring, supra note 44, at 421 (explaining the requirements that Congress de-
manded of veterans who wished to naturalize).
2013]1 617
THE SCHOLAR
military." The 1952 Act dropped all racial prohibitions to naturalization
and also retroactively applied to veterans of the First World War. 0
Most importantly, the 1952 Act contained the two statutory methods to
gain citizenship through military service that are still available today: Sec-
tions 328 and 329 of the Immigration Nationality Act, codified as 8 U.S.C.
Section 1439 and Section 1440 respectively.9 ' The former allows for natu-
ralization through peacetime service and the latter allows for naturaliza-
tion during times of war." This article discusses a method to reduce the
restrictions for combat veterans seeking naturalization under Sec-
tion 329." This statute represents the idea that actual wartime service is
the most valuable type of military service and should have the fewest
requirements for naturalization. 94 Section 328 represents the notion that
peacetime service also confers some benefit to the applicant/service-
member over the civilian applicant.95
Section 1440 allows the president to designate periods of hostilities to
which its benefits will extend. This provision has been utilized variously
over the past fifty years, but most recently in Executive Order No. 13269
of July 3, 2002, during President George W. Bush's administration.97 This
act designated the period of hostilities after September 11, 2001 as appli-
cable under Section 1440 to the naturalization of foreign service-mem-
bers.98 This period of hostilities is still ongoing, more than eleven years
later. Due to more recent changes, service-members are no longer re-
quired to pay the application fee-often in excess of $370-which is an
meaningful advantage compared to the general pool of applicants.99 Re-
gardless, this fee waiver greatly benefits disadvantaged and minority
groups in America because these groups comprise the majority of aliens
in the U.S. Armed Forces.' 00
89. Id. at 423-24.
90. Id. at 425.
91. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 414, § 328, 66 Stat. 249 (1952) (codi-
fied as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1439) (1952); Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No.
414, §328, 66 Stat. 250 (1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1439 (2004)).
92. Id.
93. Id. §329, 66 Stat. 250-251.
94.- Id.
95. Id.
96. 8 U.S.C. § 1440 (2012).
97. Exec. Order No. 13268, 67 Fed. Reg. 45,287, 45, 287 (Jul. 3, 2002).
98. Id.
99. Herring, supra note 40, at 22.
100. NATURALIZATION THROUGH MILITARY SERVICE: FAcr SHEET, supra note 32.
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C. The Nexus Between Military Naturalization and Good Moral
Character
The history of the good moral character requirement and military natu-
ralization are forever intertwined. From the Revolutionary War to the
deserts of Iraq, foreigners have pledged their loyalty to the United States
and fought in her wars, of which many were true existential crises for the
nation.'0 ' These individuals demonstrate some of the greatest traits of
Americans such as courage, determination, and loyalty. They have both
the will to overcome adversity and to stand up against oppression. They
enlist into our military fully aware of the fact that their actions may have
existential consequences in a far more literal and personal sense.
Having been at war for over a decade now, we must re-evaluate, as a
nation, the value that we place on military service in designated combat
zones. From its inception, our nation has traditionally attributed signifi-
cant social value to such inimitable service.102 The significance of this
service must be weighed against all types of prior bad acts to determine,
for the good moral character analysis, which acts are excusable and which
ones must still present a permanent bar to citizenship. Previously, the
Immigration and Nationality Act embraced such a balancing test in for-
mer Section 212(c), and this test should be reconsidered in the naturaliza-
tion context. This article does not suggest that any habitual criminal who
happens to be a veteran should be given citizenship as a matter of course,
but the expansion of the 'aggravated felony' term to many un-convicted,
drug-related, non violent, or misdemeanor acts clearly over-reaches the
original intent of the good moral character requirement and the great
history of its application.
III. WHAT MAKEs FOREIGNERS FIGHT FOR OUR COUNTRY
Section 337.1 of Title 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations mandates
that every naturalizing citizen must take an oath upon completion of the
requirements for citizenship in order to finally become a citizen."0 ' This
101. MARGAREIT D. STOCK, ESSENTIAL.TOTIIE FIGHT: IMMIGRANIS IN T118l -IICARY
EIGiff YEARS AFI'ER 9/11, 3 (2009), available at http://immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/
files/docs/Immigrants-in theMilitary_-_Stock_ 110909_0.pdf.
102. Goring, supra note 44.
103, 8 C.F.R. § 337.1 (2012). The oath states:
I hereby declare, on oath, that I absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all alle-
giance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty, of whom or
which I have heretofore been a subject or citizen; that I will support and defend the
Constitution and laws of the United States of America against all enemies, foreign and
domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I will bear arms on
behalf of the United States when required by the law; that I will perform noncomba-
tant service in the Armed Forces of the United States when required by the law; that I
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oath is significant for many reasons; the first significant aspect mandates
that the oath-maker repudiate the authority of their nation of origin.104
The potential citizen must also make several substantial promises pertain-
ing their allegiance to our nation in times of war and the potential for
both military and civil service in such times.' Notably absent are any
pledges to act with "good moral character." But strangely, when it comes
to military and civil service in times of emergency, the oath of citizenship
includes three more provisions than the oath of enlistment for the United
States military.
I, _ , do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend
the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and
domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; and
that I will obey the orders of the President of the United States and
the orders of the officers appointed over me, according to regula-
tions and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. So help me God.106
The preceding oath of enlistment for the United States military con-
tains the basic promises of a service member's respective commitments to
the Constitution, the Nation, and the chain of command. It also subjects
oath-maker to the Uniform Code of Military Justice. From the perspec-
tive of a natural-born citizen, the individual provisions of this oath ap-
pears intuitive. However, when read from the perspective of a non-
citizen, the oath of enlistment raises many of the same concerns as the
oath of citizenship. Like the oath of citizenship, it is both a repudiation
of one's own homeland in many respects and a vow to an adopted nation,
which may not necessarily reciprocate the feelings of inclusion.
Thus, a major concern facing foreigners today when joining our mili-
tary is uncertainty-not only about war and combat, but also uncertainty
as to how much their adopted nation values their service. While the in-
herent risk to life is inescapable during wartime, many of the procedural
uncertainties facing these service members today are a more recent crea-
tion. As it stands at the time of this writing, these men and women may
be risking their life and freedom citizenship that may never be granted.
While the reality of combat is undeniably harsh, perhaps even harsher are
those laws allowing a denial of citizenship based on crimes that did not
end in conviction.
will perform work of national importance under civilian direction when required by
the law; and that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or pur-
pose of evasion; so help me God.
Id.
104. 8 C.F.R. § 337.1 (2012).
105. Id.
106. 10 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2006).
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These brave men and women volunteer for service that many Ameri-
cans are either unwilling or unable to do because of physical or mental
inability, or because of legal disqualification."o Our country benefits
greatly not only from the unique cultural and language skills'o 8 that these
people bring into our military but also from their undeniable patriotism.
Undoubtedly, their actions demonstrate that these people are distinctly
American no matter where they originate, because they understand and
value the price of freedom as well as, and maybe even better than, some
natural-born citizens. The dignity of their sacrifice demands that a better-
articulated and more uniform procedure be established so that these men
and women can properly evaluate what they are giving up and what they
stand to gain by joining our armed forces.
Allowing foreigners to risk their lives by joining our military should
continue to be an honored path to full citizenship and not used merely as
a recruiting tool to take advantage of individuals to fill the ranks. The
procedures for naturalizing our service-members should be made more
just by allowing for a greater application of leniency for past non-violent
criminal convictions. Additionally, any acts not resulting in conviction
should be disregarded for service members who have served in a time of
war and apply for citizenship under Section 329 of INA. In essence, the
presence of honorable wartime military service in an application for natu-
ralization should outweigh some types of bad conduct that would nor-
mally preclude a finding of good moral character.
Before examining the problem directly, a few facts will help illustrate
who these people are that risk their lives for our freedom. The history of
foreigners serving in our military is not only long but also involves a di-
verse group of people. The Revolutionary War was brought to an end
with the help of Frenchmen fighting along side the colonists and blockad-
ing General Cornwallis at Yorktown. 0 Out of 1.5 million Union soldiers
in the Civil War, 20 percent of them were foreign-born.1 0 That number
107. MissioN: READINEss-MIIrARY LEADERS FOR Kos, R oADY, WILINo, AND
UNAnBi.i To SI.Rvu 1 (2009), available at http://cdn.missionreadiness.org/MR-Ready-Will-
ing-Unable.pdf.
108. See Julia Preston, Pentagon Reopens Program Allowing Immigrants with Special
Skills to Enlist, N.Y. Timies, Oct. 27,2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/28/us/pentagon-
reopens-program-allowing-immigrants-with-special-skills-to-enlist.htmi (noting that "Offi-
cials are also looking for native speakers of 44 languages, including Azerbaijani,
Cambodian-Khmer, Hausa and Igbo (both spoken in West Africa), Persian Dari (spoken
in Afghanistan), Portuguese, and Tamil (spoken in South Asia). Spanish is not on the list
of languages.").
109. JOHN E. FiUING, ALMOST A MIRACLE: TiH AMERICAN VICTORY IN TIE WAR
oF INDEPENDENCE 531 (2007).
110. Jeanne Batalova, Immigrants in the US Armed Forces, MIGRATION INFORMATION
(May 2008), http://www.migrationinformation.org/feature/display.cfm?ID=683.
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was actually a substantial drop from the 1840's when around half of the
military recruits were immigrants."' Throughout World War I, World
War II, and the Vietnam War, legal permanent residents were subjected
to the draft up until the last draft call went out in December 1972.112
One could view this status-involving a limited right to remain in this
country and work, but with no voting rights or eligibility for other ser-
vices-as a sort of intermediate ground, half-way between being an illegal
foreigner and a full citizen. Interestingly, even in 2008, long after the
U.S. government eliminated the draft and in a time when the law permit-
ted legal residents to remain in this country indefinitely, over 65,000 for-
eign-born service members served in the U.S. military." 3 This number
represented about 4.8 percent of 1.36 million active duty service mem-
bers.1 4 The figures are also significant because they show that substan-
tial numbers of foreign-born service members are still willing to serve in a
time of war. These figures are also significant because they show that a
substantial number of foreign-born service members have committed to
serving our country during a time of war. Also worth noting, out of these
65,000 military members, approximately 11,000 are foreign-born wo-
men. 1 ' With these facts in mind, it is easy to understand how military
naturalization has become a significant, if not also an unsung, pathway to
becoming an American citizen.
Further, one could conclude that this pathway to citizenship provides
our country with a unique source of quality citizens. On this point and
according to the American Immigration Council, Polish immigrant Gen-
eral John Shalikashvili is the "most prominent contemporary exam-
ple.""' General Shalikashvili immigrated from Poland shortly after
World War II and went on to serve as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, one of the highest ranking positions in our nation's military'"
11 Id.
112. See John T. Correll, When the Draft Calls Ended, 91 AIR FORCE MAGAZINE7,
April 2008, at 68, 73, available at http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/
Pages/2008/Aprilpercent202008/0408draft.aspx (identifying the last person to be inducted
into the U.S. military as the result of the draft as Dwight Elliott Stone, a "[twenty-four]-
year old apprentice plumber from Sacramento, Calif.").
113. Batalova, supra note 110.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. MARGARET D. STOCK, IMMIGRATION PouICY CTR. OF TiE AMERICAN IMMIGRA-
TION CouNca., ESSENTIAL TO THE FIGHTF: IMMIGRANTS IN THE MILITARY EIGIT YEARS
ArER 9/11, 4 (2009), available at http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/special-reports/essen-
tial-fight-immigrants-military-eight-years-after-91 1.
117. Id.
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The largest number of foreign nationals serving in the U.S. military
come from the Philippines and Mexico." 8 They numbered roughly
15,000 and 6,000 respectively, in 2008."' Since 2004, policy changes have
allowed these service members to participate in naturalization ceremo-
nies abroad, for example, at U.S. military bases located in ally nations
and conflict zones.12 0 Also, one should note that this group of service
members includes personnel born in various west-Asian countries, includ-
ing, for instance, Iraq (ninety-seven service members), Pakistan (sixty-
nine service members), Afghanistan (twenty-seven service members),
Syria (thirteen service members), and even Iran (thirty-two service mem-
bers).12 ' Additionally, since 9/11, the government has posthumously
awarded citizenship to over one hundred service members, killed in the
line of duty.12 2 This is an important benefit because it allows the immedi-
ate family members of the deceased-surviving widows and children-to
obtain U.S. citizenship.' Of all the military branches, the Navy has the
most foreign-born service members.' 24 Approximately 8 percent of all
individuals serving in the Navy are foreign-born.125 While this group of
service members not only hails from diverse nations, a great bulk of can
also be classified into particular minority groups. This is especially true
for Hispanics who, when compared to the total force, are slightly under-
represented in the military as compared to the general population'12  de-
118. Batalova, supra note 110.
119. Id. In 2008, 22.8 percent (14,854) of the foreign-born U.S. military service mem-
bers were from the Philippines while 9.5 percent (6,188) were from Mexico. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See Jeffrey P. Sexton, Noncitizen Servicemembers: Do They Really Have to Die to
Become U.S. Citizens?, ARMy LAw., Sep. 2008, at 50, 50 (recognizing that not only does
posthumous citizenship bestow an "inimitable honor" upon the fallen service member but
that it, also, generates "special immigration and naturalization opportunities for the de-
ceased's direct family members, such as the eligibility for permanent resident and citizen-
ship processing."); see also O'Neill, supra note 15 (identifying non-naturalized service
members as "Green cared soldiers" and commenting on how, of the 37,000 soldiers cur-
rently naturalized, 109 have been granted citizenship posthumously).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See Ann Marlow, The Truth About Who Fights for Us, WALL Sr. J., Sept. 27,
2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111903791504576587244025371456.html?
mod=rssopinion-main (stating that while considering how Hispanics are under-
represented in the military, "the explanation . . . is probably ... a matter of difficulty
speaking English. Only 12 percent of Army enlisted personnel are Hispanic, as opposed to
21 percent in the 18-39 year old population with a high school degree.").
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spite the fact that Hispanics comprise the greatest number of service
members seeking naturalization.12 7
In order to understand the problems facing these brave Americans, one
must first consider what it is that these individuals hope to gain from their
military service. As shown, their goal is often American citizenship.
While the differences between a citizen and a legal permanent resident
may appear nominal to some, these distinctions can mean a great deal for
those individuals without the full benefits of membership in our society.
As a practical matter, however, there are important similarities. Both
legal permanent residents and citizens are required to pay taxes.12 8 Both
have a right to remain in the United States (although the quality of that
right is certainly different),129 and both have similar guarantees of due
process under the Constitution.3 o
Regardless of these similarities, the differences, nevertheless, reveal a
lesser status for the legal permanent resident. The most obvious differ-
ence being the right of a citizen to vote. It has been said that "one of the
most important privileges of democracy in the United States of America
is the right to participate in choosing elected officials through voting in
elections.""' This is a right, which a legal permanent resident can never
reasonably expect to gain because this right is one of the defining factors
between the two status types. 3 While voting rights are the hallmark of
full membership in our national community, are they also the reason that
people risk their lives by joining our military? Are these rights desirable
enough to justify such an immediate risk, as opposed to waiting the statu-
torily proscribed five-year period?
127. See Herring, supra note 40, at 20, 32 (showing that of the total number of immi-
grants in the U.S. military, as of April 2003, naturalized citizens and non-citizens from the
Philippines and Mexico comprise 25.2 percent and 10.2 percent, respectively).
128. Tax Topic 851-Resident and Nonresident Aliens, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/
taxtopics/tc851.html (last reviewed or updated Sept. 14, 2012).
129. Rights and Responsibilities of a Green Card Holder (Permanent Resident), US-
CIS, http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem (follow "Green Card" hyperlink; then
"Rights and Responsibilities of a Green Card Holder" hyperlink) (last updated Aug. 16,
2010).
130. See, e.g., Ferreras v. Ashcroft, 160 F. Supp. 2d 617, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (provid-
ing an example of due process analysis in the context of a legal permanent resident alien
and stating that "legal permanent resident aliens, who have been admitted to the United
States, enjoy rights under the Constitution, including the right to due process of law in
connection with deprivation of life, liberty or property.") (quoting Zadvydas v. Davis, 533
U.S. 678, 692 (2001)).
131. The Right to Vote, USCIS (June 6, 2010), http://www.uscis.gov/portal/siteluscis/
menuitem (follow "Green Card" hyperlink; then "The Right to Vote" hyperlink) (last up-
dated June 6, 2010).
132. Id.
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In light of these considerations, one should also consider other relevant
and meaningful differences between the two status types. Legal perma-
nent residents are not allowed to hold a public office or hold government
jobs'"-with the notable exception of the military, but non-citizens can-
not join the officer corps of any branch of the military.'3 4 However, the
most practical difference for a potential enlistee may be the ease with
which citizens may bring their families to the United States as opposed to
legal permanent residents. 3 5 The Pentagon has recently succeeded in
shortening this process from years to months for military recruits who
enlist in specialized fields, namely medical and linguistic areas.13 6
Also there are at least two other sources of motivation for joining the
armed forces worth mentioning: opportunity and pride. While there is a
general sense of opportunity simply in coming to the United States and
gaining legal permanent resident status, the type of opportunity the mili-
tary provides is more concrete. Instead of the mere promise or hope of a
gainful employment, the military itself is a substantive job that is almost
always hiring." Also, the military does not historically eliminate its em-
ployees through mass layoffs or merely employ seasonal labor.138 One
can see that, for humble foreigners who might lack the training, educa-
tion, or experience necessary to compete in the private sector of the U.S.
economy, the U.S. military effectually provides almost instant access to
133. See STANIY A. RENsHoN, CENTE-1R FOR IMMIGRATION Siuoiis, ALOWING
NON-CIrzu'Ns To VOTE IN THE U.S.? Wiiy Nor 21 (2008), available at http://www.cis.org/
NoncitizenVoting (discussing a particular case in New York in which non-citizens were
denied the right to stand for a specific civil-service examination and more broadly quoting
"[t]his Court has never held that aliens have a constitutional right to vote or to hold high
public office under the Equal Protection Clause.").
134. See MoiiY F. McINTOSIH ET AL., CAN's INsTITUTE FOR Punuc REsEARCH,
NON-CITIZENS IN Tiu ENISTED U.S. MIITARY 5 (2011) (identifying one area of differ-
ence involving officer accessions into the U.S. Army Reserve whereby non-citizens holding
green cards can serve as commissioned officers in either the medical branch, the legal
branch, or the chaplain corps).
135. See Green Card for a Family Member of a Permanent Resident, USCIS, http://
www.uscis.gov/portal/siteluscis/menuitem (follow "Green Card" hyperlink; then "Green
Card for a Family Member of a Permanent Resident" hyperlink) (last visited Dec. 24,
2012) (highlighting the differences between permanent resident relatives and relatives of
U.S. citizens).
136. See Preston, supra note 108 (stating that immigrants can obtain expedited citizen-
ship by the time they complete basic training, which can be as few as ten weeks).
137. See, e.g., Military Recruitment 2010, NATIONAL. PRIoRrrIIEs (June 30,2012), http://
nationalpriorities.org/analysis/2011/military-recruitment-2010 (stating that the Army, for
instance, met its recruiting goal of 74,500 active duty recruits for fiscal year 2010, a time
when other sectors of the U.S. economy were not expanding their employee labor force).
138. Kate Pomeroy, Will Budget Cuts Lead to Army Layoffs?, CONCERNED VIT-2I1
ANS FOR AMFRICA (Apr. 26, 2012), http://concernedveteransforamerica.org/2012/04/26/
will-budget-cuts-lead-to-army-layoffs.
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the American dream: a secure job with great benefits along with a path-
way to citizenship. While service members may lack a certain amount of
discretion in choosing where to live, they can rest assured that for which-
ever duty station the government assigns them, there will be included a
welcoming and diverse community of military personnel and their fami-
lies, along with schools, housing, and a sponsorship program to help with
the integration of newly arrived personnel into the surrounding commu-
nity.3 9 This is true whether the base is in Texas, South Korea, Germany.
or Alaska.14 0 One should consider the expanse of these military support
programs when considering what, if any, support organizations are availa-
ble to civilian applicants for U.S. citizenship.
There is one significant drawback to military service, however, and that
is the real possibility of having to engage in armed conflict. On this point,
one can see however, that the other motivational factor, discussed above,
comes into play. While voting rights may define full citizenship, it seems
intuitive that an overwhelming sense of pride in America forms the desire
and motivation of many foreign-born individuals when they make the de-
cision to enter military service. No doubt, the pride these individuals
hold for their adopted homeland motivates them to do things that many
native-born citizens can not or will not do. In addition, one should con-
sider that, while this country took a chance in welcoming these individu-
als into our society, these individuals, as well, took a chance on our
American society by risking their lives through military service. As a so-
ciety we should recognize that there is a sacred element involved in these
unspoken agreements-an aspect to the agreement that effectively makes
such individuals into American citizens instantaneously, in substance if
not in law. Regardless of politics, when our nation enters into an armed
conflict, the individuals who answer our nation's call to service are meet-
ing the very same set of obligations that empires, nation-sates, kingdoms,
and tribes have demanded of their citizens throughout history. What sac-
rifice could possibly be more appropriate to confer citizenship, if not the
sacrifice made by those who defend our nation in battle? And more im-
portantly, what does it say about America if our practice is to rely on the
139. See, e.g., MWR History, ARMY MWR, http://www.armymwr.com/commander/his-
tory.aspx (last visited Dec. 24, 2012) (providing a developmental history of support organi-
zations within the U.S. Army). Specifically, the U.S. Army has created organizations such
as the U.S. Army Community and Family Support Center in order to address such diverse
issues as "child care, youth programs, schools, libraries, sports and athletics, financial coun-
seling, spouse employment programs . . . lodging, and fitness centers." Id.
140. See, e.g., My Installation, ARMY MWR, http://www.armymwr.com/installation/de-
fault.aspx (last visited Dec. 24, 2012) (providing links to MWR support organizations lo-
cated at Army installations across the world).
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sons and daughters of other nations in our own conflicts and then deny
those same individuals membership into our society?
As a matter of practical concern, it is difficult, one might say, to deter-
mine exactly when an immigrant service-member transforms into an
American. It may be when that person swears their allegiance to our
nation's Constitution, or when that individual arrives at basic training. It
may be when that individual's boots touch down in a foreign combat
zone. At one of these times, we stop referring to these individuals as
"foreigners," and start calling them "American Soldier," "American
Sailor," "American Airman," or "American Marine." Once these indi-
viduals put on our military uniform, they represent our nation and the
best that we have to offer. Can we really say that such individuals who
wear the American flag, our flag, on their shoulder, and who deploy to
places like Iraq and Afghanistan, are not true Americans? Can we really
say this about individuals who deal with daily bouts of small arms fire,
improvised explosive devices, suicide bombers, and mortar attacks? Can
we deny them citizenship even though we may not be brave enough or
able enough to go and fight for our own country ourselves? Can we re-
ally deny these individuals the title of "American citizen" because of past
conduct that did not even result in a conviction? Clearly the service such
individuals render our nation is of great value. The long history of re-
laxed naturalization requirements for those who choose to serve provides
substantial evidence of our nation's recognition of this fact.
By looking closely of the categories of behavior preventing these ser-
vice members from naturalizing can illustrate the absurdity of the current
state of the law. As of the writing of this Comment, the types of conduct
that can prevent a finding of good moral character are numerous and
diverse. As mentioned earlier, many of them fall under the 'aggravated
felony' term of art even though they are neither felonies nor criminal
convictions. This examination focuses on several types of behavior that
are important in the naturalization context: violent crimes, crimes of
'moral turpitude,' and the blanket term "aggravated felony." The impor-
tance of relying on the applicant's behavior comes from Congress as in-
terpreted by the Supreme Court. In United States v. Macintosh '4 the
141. 283 U.S. 605 (1931). The Court stated:
In specifically requiring that the applicant ... has behaved a man of good moral char-
acter, attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States, etc., it is
obvious that Congress regarded the fact of good character and the fact of attachment
to the principles of the Constitution as matters of the first importance. The applicant's
behavior is significant to the extent that it tends to establish or negative these facts.
United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 616 (1931).
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court described the importance of behavior as a factor in the good moral
character analysis.14 2
In deference to this logic, the alternative analysis suggested by this es-
say focuses on the behavior of the immigrant who serves the United
States during wartime. Just as prior bad conduct can tend to disprove
good moral character, this behavior tends to demonstrate its existence.
As a general matter of timeliness, if the past conduct occurred before the
honorable military service, then it would be more reasonable to assume
that it could outweigh some prior transgressions. Also, it is difficult to
imagine any act showing more attachment to the principles of the Consti-
tution than swearing a public oath to support and defend that document.
Federal district courts are recognized to have discretion to determine
good moral character in fact,'' and their analysis should not ignore this
extraordinary act. Generally, the courts enjoy some agreement concern-
ing the principles underlying the good moral character analysis, but the
application of the character inquiry by the courts has proven to be
problematic. 14 4
The first type of behavior to be examined is violent crimes. This term
may include crimes like murder, rape, assault, battery, robbery, family
violence, and any crime committed with a weapon. 4 5 Unfortunately, for
alien veterans, these types of crimes automatically prohibit a finding of
good moral character, 14 6 and they should continue to prohibit such a find-
ing if they occurred in the statutory period. Crimes as serious as these
pose a threat to society. This is because crimes of violence are an ex-
treme repudiation of the basic rules of our society to allow for rehabilita-
tion if they fall within the statutory period. Our public policy cannot
encompass a special rule for veterans allowing them to naturalize in spite
of such highly reprehensible acts.
While veterans are generally portrayed as a proud and honorable
group, it is important to recognize that they are also capable of commit-
ting serious crimes just like anyone else.' 47 Sadly, this can be especially
142. Id.
143. V. Woerner, Annotation, What Constitutes Showing of "Good Moral Character"
on the Part of an Applicant for Naturalization, 22 A.L.R.2d 244 (1952).
144. Id.
145. 8 U.S.C. § 16 (2006).
146. See generally Woerner, supra note 143 (discussing cases in which veteran aliens
were barred naturalization due to these various crimes).
147. See Deborah Sontag & Lizette Alvarez, Across America, Deadly Echoes of For-
eign Battles, N.Y. TIMus, Jan. 13, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/13/us/13vets.htm?
pagewanted=all&_r=0 (discussing murders and domestic violence committed by veterans
of Iraq and Afghanistan).
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true for those who have endured the terror of close combat .148 It is now
known that many of those who deploy to combat zones may suffer from
the effects of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)."I With respect to
alien veterans, their subsequent legal problems could be linked to this
condition as a direct result of their combat service and could ultimately
have disastrous effects on their application for citizenship.1"o Specifically,
this may occur when the applicant's bad acts take place after his or her
period of honorable military service and within the statutory period re-
quiring good moral character. Particularly affected by this paradox are
those who served honorably and separated from the military, and then
applied for citizenship at a later date, like many Vietnam veterans. 151
The kinds of violent crimes that have prevented veterans from being nat-
uralized include: sexual assault,"' aiding and abetting murder,'5 3 and sec-
148. See R. Jeffrey Smith, Sharp Rise in Violent Crimes Cited Among Returning Iraq
Veterans in Colo. Unit, WASh. Posr, July 28, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/07/27/AR2009072702331.html (stating that one Army unit com-
mitted an exceptionally high number of crimes after returning from a tour in Iraq and
linking the occurrences with combat conditions and obstacles in requesting proper care).
149. See William H. McMichael, VA Diagnosing Higher Rates of PTSD, ARMY TIMES,
Jan. 16, 2009), http://www.armytimes.com/news/2009/01/military-veteranscarestats_0116
09w/ (asserting that the VA and outside organizations calculate the PTSD rate for Iraq and
Afghanistan veterans to be approximately 22-23 percent).
150. Id.
In addition, the 23 percent of veterans seen by VA who were initially diagnosed with
PTSD, Zeiss agreed, is generally in line with outside estimates. In an April study by
the Rand Corp., nearly 20 percent of Iraq and Afghanistan veterans surveyed reported
symptoms of PTSD or major depression. Many of those who have served in the wars,
Rand noted, have been exposed to prolonged periods of combat-related stress or trau-
matic events. Rand also found that many service members say they don't seek treat-
ment for psychological illnesses because they fear the repercussions will harm their
careers.
Id.
151. C. Peter Erlinder, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, Vietnam Veterans and the
Law: A Challenge to Effective Representation, Bi[AV. Sci. & LAw, 1983, at 25, 25-26,
available at http://works.bepress.com/petererlinder/20
Although estimates of the number of Vietnam combat veterans who suffer from Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder vary from as few as 500,000 to as many as 1,500,000 it is
becoming increasingly clear that a substantial number of those who served in Vietnam
continue to feel the psychological effects of that experience. The behavior associated
with PTSD not only presents diagnostic and treatment issues for mental health profes-
sionals, but may have legal implications as well.
Id.
152. See Taylor v. U.S. Att'y. Gen., 801 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1106 (W.D. Wash. 2011)
(denying application for naturalization because of Canadian conviction for sexual assault
of a minor).
153. See Toolasprashad v. Schult, No.10-CV-1050 (LEK/DRH), 2011 WL 3157297, at
*5 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 2011), report and recommendation adopted, No. 9:10-CV-1050 (LEK/
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ond-degree murder.15' The government's interest in deterring such
crimes will always enable Congress and administrative agencies to pass
stringent legislation and rules to prevent persons guilty of such acts from
obtaining citizenship. However, some courts support the notion that
there should be a place within our jurisprudence for rehabilitation, which
allows applicants to make up for past mistakes.15 5
Two major purposes form the foundation for keeping violent crimes as
statutory bars to citizenship. The first reason is that the commission of
any felony would result in the revocation of any citizen's right to vote,' 6
and the right to bear arms. As such, there is no reason to allow special
waiver of these punitive measures for any discrete group, including veter-
ans. Those who commit these acts have long been excluded from the
political process, because these acts include such a far deviation from the
basic norms of society.15 7
Second, allowing a finding of good moral character, notwithstanding
these crimes, would create precedent that allows foreign military person-
nel a free pass for violent crimes that pose a grave threat to society.
DRH), 2011 WL 3157290, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. July 26, 2011) (denying application for naturali-
zation and writ of habeas corpus because of guilty plea to aiding and abetting a murder).
154. See Castiglia v. I.N.S., No. C-94-20634-JW, 1995 WL 470217, at *1-2 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 2, 1995), affid, 108 F.3d 1101, 1104 (9th Cir. 1997) (affirming that a murder conviction
will bar a veteran's application for naturalization).
155. See Lawson v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Services, 795 F. Supp. 2d 283,
296-97 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding that a Vietnam Marine Corps veteran born in Jamaica
was able to establish good moral character despite having been convicted of manslaughter
for killing his wife during an argument in 1985, problems with drug and alcohol addiction,
and serving thirteen years in prison-all of which happened after his military service).
156. See Sharon Browne & Roger Clegg, Felons Have Lost Their Right to Vote, Los
ANatEUs Timis, June 13, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jun/13/opinion/la-oe-
browne-felonvote-20100613 (asserting that "[e]very state in the country except two-
Maine and Vermont- prohibits at least some felons from voting.").
157. Id.
In January, a panel of the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals held that the state of
Washington is violating the federal Voting Rights Act by disenfranchising felons. . . .
Every other federal court of appeals so far has ruled against using the Voting Rights
Act to give felons the right to vote. What's more, the Constitution explicitly assumes
that felons may be barred from voting. The 14th Amendment-which, like the 15th,
was passed during Reconstruction to ensure equal treatment of African Americans-
acknowledges that states can disenfranchise people for 'participation in rebellion, or
other crime.' So an interpretation of the Voting Rights Act to bar felon disen-
franchisement would not only be inconsistent with the intent of that statute, it would
exceed Congress' constitutional authority. . . . There are certain minimum and objec-
tive standards of trustworthiness, loyalty, and responsibility, and those who have com-
mitted serious crimes against their fellow citizens don't meet those standards. If you
aren't willing to follow the law, you can't demand a role in making the law.
Id.
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However, the serious nature of these acts should continue to be inexcus-
able in the naturalization analysis. Those who have committed them may
be allowed to become legal permanent residents, but they should not be
allowed to enjoy the full rights of citizenship until the statutory period of
good moral character is satisfied.
Next to be are crimes of moral turpitude. This term may include differ-
ing crimes in different jurisdictions but typically it has included things
like, fraud, forgery, embezzlement, arson, larceny, robbery, theft, bribery,
counterfeiting, mail fraud, tax evasion and perjury. 1s8 Sometimes it can
also include abandonment, adultery, bigamy, lewdness, prostitution, and
mayhem.s 9 Aiding and abetting as well as conspiracy can also be in-
cluded under this umbrella term. 1 60 For immigration purposes, the defi-
nition of 'crimes of moral turpitude' can be found in the Department of
State's Foreign Affairs Handbook, and this source also references the list
of serious crimes in Section 101(h) of INA.'6 1 These types of convictions
have precluded service members from gaining citizenship.162 While there
is no doubt that these are serious crimes, perjury in particular is problem-
atic when used as a bar to service members. While the purpose behind
excluding those who lie in court is obvious, the practice of doing so is
unjust as applied to veterans. If these people are indeed so untrustwor-
thy, then it makes little sense to let them take the oath of enlistment in
the first place. Equally nonsensical is the argument that aliens' past dis-
honesties can keep them from becoming a citizen, when those aliens have
more recently sworn an oath to uphold the Constitution relied upon by
the government. In other words, why are the citizenship standards so
much higher than the standards to join the military and represent our
nation in conflicts around the world? It is unjust to allow legal perma-
158. See generally Annotation, What Constitutes "Crime Involving Moral Turpitude"
Within Meaning of § 212(a)(9) and 241(a)(4) of Immigration and Nationality Act (8
U.S.C.A. § 1182(a) (9), 1251(a) (4)), and Similar Predecessor Statutes Providing for Exclu-
sion or Deportation of Aliens Convicted of Such Crime, 23 A.L.R. Fed. 480 (1975) (listing
the various acts that constitute crimes of moral turpitude in different jurisdictions).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. 9 FAM. 40.21(A) CRIMES INVOLVING MORAL TuiairruciE, U.S. DEPr OF SrAre
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 6 (201), available at http://www.state.gov/m/aldir/regs/fam/09fam/index.
him (last visited Dec. 14, 2010).
162. See Toolasprashad v. Schult, No.10-CV-1050 (LEK/DRH), 2011 WL 3157297, at
*5 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 2011), report and recommendation adopted, No. 9:10-CV-1050 (LEK/
DRH), 2011 WL 3157290, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. July 26, 2011) (denying an application for natu-
ralization and writ of habeas corpus because of guilty plea to aiding and abetting a mur-
der); Mobin v. Taylor, 598 F. Supp. 2d 777, 785 (E.D. Va. 2009) (denying an application for
naturalization based on a state conviction for making false statements under penalty of
perjury); Ralich v. United States, 185 F.2d 784, 788 (8th Cir. 1950) (denying a petition for
citizenship based on prior perjury conviction).
2013] 631
THE SCHOLAR
nent residents to risk their lives during times of war, yet create hurdles to
establish good moral character and suitability for citizenship.
IV. THE 'AGGRAVATED FELONY'
The intrusion of criminal law into the traditionally civil arena of immi-
gration has increased during the last twenty-five years so much that now
applicants are judged by criminal norms in a civil setting.' 3 This is a
problem because immigration law and policy have traditionally been con-
sidered civil in nature rather than penal measures.'" Some authors have
questioned the wisdom of this intrusion and suggest that trying to develop
a per se list of deportable behaviors is "fundamentally misguided."' 5
The aggravated felony provision has been expanded to include those
crimes, which by definition, would not be felonious or aggravated.166
Black's Law Dictionary defines the word "aggravated" in the context of
crime as made worse by violence, presence of a weapon, or intent to com-
mit another crime." While the scope of the common definition is quite
narrow, the term "aggravated" as used today in the immigration context
includes crimes that do not share any characteristics with the definition.
Because of this, some have even gone so far as to describe the current use
of this term "a tool for discrimination"1es a violation of international
163. See Diana R. Podgorny, Rethinking the Increased Focus on Penal Measures in
Immigration Law As Reflected in the Expansion of the "Aggravated Felony" Concept, 99 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 287, 289 (2009) (mentioning the trend towards increased
criminalization within the last twenty years); Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Im-
migration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 469, 469 (2007) (explaining the modern developments of immigration law with re-
spect to increasing incorporation of criminal law norms).
164. Harvey Silvergate, The Arizona Immigration Law is Beside the Point, FoizREs
(May 3, 2012, 9:31 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/harveysilverglate/2012/05/03/the-ari-
zona-immigration-law-is-beside-the-point/.
165. Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and
the Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARv. L. REv. 1936, 1938 (2000).
166. Podgorny, supra note 163, at 289; see also Melissa Cook, Banished for Minor
Crimes: The Aggravated Felony Provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act As a
Human Rights Violation, 23 B.C. TIRD WORLD L.J. 293, 293 (2003); see Adriane
Meneses, The Deportation of Lawful Permanent Residents for Old and Minor Crimes: Re-
storing Judicial Review, Ending Retroactivity, and Recognizing Deportation As Punishment,
14 SCHOLAR 767, 778 (2012) ("Over time, the criminal grounds for which an alien can be
denied entry to the United States, as well as the grounds for which an alien in the United
States can be removed, have expanded enormously.").
167. Black's Law Dictionary 28 (3d ed. 1996).
168. Podgorny, supra note 163, at 290. See Linda Greenhouse, Justices Ponder Condi-
tions for Automatic Deportation, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2006, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/
fullpage.html?res=9AO3E6D61430F937A35753C1 A9609C8B63 ("The intersection of fed-
eral criminal law and immigration law is a perilous place for the millions of legal residents
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human rights.1 69 When it was introduced in 1988's Anti Drug Abuse Act,
the term only included murder, and drug and weapon trafficking.o7 0
Then in 1996, further legislation limited the relief that aliens could seek
from the government, and applied the aggravated felony term retroac-
tively to acts before it was passed and expanded the definition to almost
any criminal act."' One way in which it does so is by categorizing as an
aggravated felony any finding of guilt in a formal hearing or any guilty or
nolo contendere plea as long as it is accompanied by a penalty or punish-
ment."' This applies to the entire list of crimes prohibited by 8 U.S.C.
Section 1101. Consequently, the aggravated felony analysis statutorily
excludes more people than ever before. The argument for this practice
appears logical when considered from an aggregate perspective because
the government does have a substantial interest in ensuring that alien
criminals aren't allowed to become citizens,173 but it brings up important
due process considerations as well.
of the United States who are not citizens: one slip, one criminal conviction, can mean
deportation.").
169. Melissa Cook, Banished for Minor Crimes: The Aggravated Felony Provision of
the Immigration and Nationality Act As A Human Rights Violation, 23 B.C. TIio WORIL)
L.J. 293, 295 (2003).
170. Natalie Liem, Mean What You Say, Say What You Mean: Defining the Aggra-
vated Felony Deportation Grounds to Target More Than Aggravated Felons, 59 FLA. L.
Rvv. 1071, 1076 (2007).
171. Podgorny, supra note 163, at 294; see Chris Hedges, Condemned Again for Old
Crimes; Deportation Law Descends Sternly, and Often by Surprise, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30,
2000, http://www.nytimes.com/2000/08/30/nyregion/condemned-again-for-old-crimes-de-
portation-law-descends-sternly-often-surprise.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm (noting that
members of families are being detained for minor crimes committed years ago).
172. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48) (2006); Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Re-
sponsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codi-
fied as amended 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48) (2006); see Linda Greenhouse, Across the Border,
Over the Line, OPINIOATiOR N.Y. TIMrs (April 8, 2010, 9:45 PM), http://opinion-
ator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/04/08/across-the-border-over-the-line/ (discussing that admit-
ting guilt to minor crimes can lead to deportation and lawyers have a duty to warn their
non-citizen clients of that fact).
173. Alan Gomez and Kevin Johnson, Most Illegal Immigrants Deported Last Year
Were Criminals, USA ToDAY, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/story/
2011-10-18/deportations-criminals-homeland-security/50807532/1 (last updated Oct. 18,
2011, 12:49 PM).
Deportations have been on the rise for the past decade, and the 396,906 illegal immi-
grants deported in fiscal year 2011 is the highest number yet, according to the figures.
Under the Obama administration, Homeland Security issued new priorities to focus
deportations on convicted criminals, people who pose threats to national security and
repeated border-crossers. Last year, [fifty-five percent] of those deported were con-
victed criminals, the highest percentage in nearly a decade . . . Of the convicted
criminals deported last year, 1,119 were convicted of homicide, 5,848 of sexual of-
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For example, in 1993, the Supreme Court held in Reno v. Flores,17 4 that
aliens are guaranteed the protections of due process under the Fifth
Amendment.17 5 But what this means in a practical sense is unclear, be-
cause the courts can exclude many familiar constitutional protections in
the civil context of a removal proceeding. One author summarized the
distinctions succinctly:
Few constitutional challenges present themselves because the Court
has always construed deportation as a civil proceeding. Thus, crimi-
nal proceeding protections do not apply. The Sixth Amendment
does not guarantee the right to government-appointed counsel in a
civil proceeding, and Fourth Amendment exclusionary rules of evi-
dence do not apply. The courts have also rejected challenges based
on cruel and unusual punishment and double jeopardy by concluding
that deportation is not punitive. Accordingly, the Ex Post Facto
Clause, which bars retroactive application of punitive legislation,
does not apply either. Furthermore, only limited due process protec-
tions apply. Because of this, the courts offer limited recourse, save
for textual-interpretation challenges."7
Several areas of the 'aggravated felony' definition are difficult for all
applicants, but they are especially unjust when applied to veterans seek-
ing citizenship.' 7  This is because the current jurisprudence in good
moral character analysis largely ignores the applicant's record of service,
despite the fact that military service is a behavior-based measure of char-
acter as favored by the Supreme Court in Macintosh."'8 Some of the
fenses, 44,653 of drug-related offenses and 35,927 of driving under the influence, ac-
cording to the Homeland Security figures.
Id.
174. 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993).
175. Id.; see Van Eeton v. Beebe, 49 F. Supp. 2d 1186,1190 (D. Or. 1999) (holding that
an immigration detention statute was not narrowly tailored enough to serve the govern-
ment's compelling interest of preventing alien felons from absconding and thus violated
the substantive due process 5th Amendment rights of Vietnam War combat veteran and
legal permanent resident from the Netherlands); see also Lara-Torres v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d
968, 972 (9th Cir. 2004); Hernandez v. Mukasey, 524 F.3d 1014, 1019 (9th Cir. 2008) (hold-
ing that immigrants' reliance on the deficient advice of a non-attorney immigration con-
sultant could not support claim for deprivation of their Fifth Amendment due process right
to competent representation).
176. Liem, supra note 170, at 1080.
177. See Petition of Suey Chin, 173 F. Supp. 510, 511 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (holding that a
WW II veteran was not of good moral character because he was an admitted narcotics user
and denying his petition for naturalization); see also McLeary v. U.S. Citizenship and Im-
migration Services, 11-CV-6075 MAT, 2012 WL 967970 (W.D.N.Y. Mar 21, 2012) (denying
an application for naturalization from an Air Force veteran and legal permanent resident
since 1963 from Jamaica, whose of arrests for burglary occurred over 40 years later).
178. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605.
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crimes included as aggravated felonies are not aggravated in the common
sense because they do not involve any kind of violent act or a weapon.
Fraud,' 7 9 money laundering (exceeding $10,000),"Io tax evasion (exceed-
ing $10,000),"' altering identity documents,' 8  theft offenses, 1 3 racke-
teering,' 8 4 and some gambling related offenses' 8 5 are all examples of
crimes where the guilty party has committed no violence, and used no
weapon, but is nevertheless held to the standard of a murderer or a rapist
in the immigration context. The list also includes failure to appear for a
felony charge, 8" two kinds of bribery,187 perjury,'" obstruction of jus-
tice,'89 counterfeiting,' 90 forgery,' 9 ' and any attempt or conspiracy92 to
commit any of the acts labeled as an 'aggravated felony,'
The principle mechanism by which recent legislation has expanded the
reach of this term is overbroad language.19 3 The trouble with the over-
179. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(43)(M)(i) (2006).
180. Id. § 1101(a)(43)(D) (2006).
181. Id. § 1101 (2006); see Kelly Phillips Erb, Supreme Court Finds Tax Crimes Are
Grounds for Deportation, FORBES (Feb. 22, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyphillip-
serb/201 2/02/22/supreme-court-finds-tax-crimes-are-grounds-for-deportation/ (explaining
the Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's order removing resident aliens for their
convictions of tax related crimes). Three Justices dissented, arguing that the ruling was
vague because it included a wide-variety of tax offenses in its definition of aggravated
felonies. Id.
182. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2006) (describing the charge as "falsely making, forging,
counterfeiting, mutilating, or altering a passport.").
183. See id. (including a burglary offense which results in imprisonment for one year).
184. Id.; see Spacek v. Holder, 688 F.3d 536, 536 (8th Cir. 2012) (holding that a resi-
dent alien convicted for racketeering constitutes an aggravated felony).
185. See § 1101 (defining gambling as including, but not limited to, bookmaking, rou-
lette wheels, pool-selling, maintaining slot machines or dice tables, bolita or numbers
games, and conducting lotteries).
186. Id.
187. Id.; see Nyakatura v. Attorney Gen. USA, No. 06-3204, 256 Fed.Appx 461, 461
(3d Cir. 2007) (holding that a conviction of bribery constituted an aggravated felony).
188. § 1101; see Mobin v. Taylor 598 F.Supp.2d 777,777 (E.D. Va. 2009) (declaring
state perjury conviction amounted to aggravated felony).
189. § 1101; see Denis v. Attorney Gen. USA 633 F.3d 201, 202 (3d Cir. 2011) (opin-
ing that an alien's conviction for tampering with evidence bore close to obstruction of
justice and thus amounted to an aggravated felony).
190. § 1101; see Kamagate v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 144, 144 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that
possession or utterance of counterfeit securities constitutes an aggravated felony).
191. § 1101; see Drakes v. Zimski, 240 F.3d 246, 246 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting that a
forgery conviction and a one year jail sentence amounted to an aggravated felony).
192. § 1101; see Conteh v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 45, 45 (1st Cir. 2006) (alien's conviction
of conspiracy met the qualifications for aggravated felony).
193. See Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home; Serving Family Values, N.Y. Tuves, Apr.
8, 2000, http://www.nytimes.com/2000/04/08/opinion/abroad-at-home-serving-family-values.
html (stating that "[the] effect of an overbroad law applied rigidly, without humanity, is to
punish people .... ).
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broad language is that it leads to inconsistent interpretation and enforce-
ment, erring almost exclusively on the side of the state.' 9 4 The Supreme
Court recognized that uniformity should be a guiding principle over the
practice of utilizing state law instead of federal categorizations of what
constitutes an aggravated felony,"9 s but even this endorsement has not
prompted Congress to rewrite the law and balance the analysis in a fair
manner. So one topic of confusion continues to be whether the term 'fel-
ony' is determined under federal or state classifications, or both.'96 Un-
fortunately, the Supreme Court has provided conflicting guidance on this
particular question.'9 7 This is highly problematic because it could result
in even more expansive grounds for denial of naturalization and granting
of removal. Immigration judges could exploit this procedural uncertainty
and cherry pick from whichever criminal code classifies the applicant's
behavior most severely. When such ambiguity comes even from the high-
est of our courts, we should ask ourselves whether this legal framework is
accomplishing a desired and favorable result.
The two major criticisms of this part of the immigration process are
first, that the aggravated felony analysis unjustly applies criminal penal-
ties in the civil context of immigration law, and second, that immigration
judges avoid looking into the applicant's good acts because no framework
exists for doing so. While the Supreme Court has suggested that an anal-
ysis based on behavior is acceptable,"' the current practice overempha-
sizes bad acts and ignores good ones, resulting in an overall decrease of
due process in the immigration process."
194. See Liem, supra note 170, at 1081 (considering the aggravated felony category of
fraud, which is prefaced by the phrase "relating to" and leads to convictions where intent
to defraud or knowledge are not proven, despite that a majority of states require these
elements).
195. See id. at 1084 (asserting that when no federal definition exists, courts look to a
definition that would most likely result in uniformity).
196. See Abbe Kingston, Aggravated Felonies-Harsh Consequences, KMH IMMIGRA-
TION, http://www.kmhimmigration.com/aggravated-felonies.html (last visited Dec. 24,
2012) (illustrating that even a state misdemeanor at times will qualify as an aggravated
felony under the federal definition).
197. Compare Lopez v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 47, 47 (2006) (holding that state felony of
aiding and abetting of possession of cocaine was not contemplated as an aggravated felony
under the INA when federal classification of the same crime was a misdemeanor), with
Gonzalez v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 183 (2007) (holding that violation of California
statute prohibiting taking vehicle without consent was a "theft offense" as contemplated by
INA § 101(a)(43)(G)).
198. See Macintosh, 283 U.S. at 616 (explaining that behavior is a significant factor in
establishing or negating whether or not the applicant is of good moral character).
199. See Kathleen Lord-Black, Aggravated Felonies and Due Process, LEGAL-IMMI-
GRATION-STATUS.CoM (Feb. 25, 2010), http://legalimmigrationstatus.blogspot.com/2010/02/
636 [Vol. 15:603
MILITARY NA TURA LIZA TION
V. GOOD MORAL CHARACTER
While the term "aggravated felony" has expanded beyond reason,20 0
the major critique of the good moral character analysis is that it is under-
articulated and ambiguous. 2 01 The term itself, "good moral character," is
necessarily loaded with preconceptions of all types, some concerning the
applicant's upbringing and basic morals and others concerning race, so-
cioeconomic status, and the like.20 2 It is also loaded with the idea that
those who have good moral character do not engage in criminal acts. 2 0 3
Consequently, the 'analysis' has devolved into a practice of defining good
moral character by what it is not.2 The reporters are packed with exam-
ples of courts stating that certain crimes prevent a finding a good moral
character, but the record is mostly devoid of cases specifying the positive
acts that could prove its existence.20 5 The alternative offered in this essay
is a simple and familiar balancing test. This test is taken from the recog-
aggravated-felonies-and-due-process.html (explaining that the definition of aggravated fel-
ony has an impact on immigration cases).
The history of the term 'aggravated felony' as used in U.S. immigration law is a study
of the decline of due process in our immigration laws.. . The price of this abridgment
to due process is paid for by the lawful permanent residents, their U.S. citizen chil-
dren, and their spouses and parents whose families are split apart, whose homes are
broken, and whose lives are forever altered.
Id.
200. See id. (discussing Congress's expansion of the definition of "aggravated
felony").
201. Woerner, supra note 143, at 12-13.
202. See id. (discussing the various factors affecting each judge's definition of "good
moral character" in naturalization cases).
203. See 8 C.F.R. § 316.10 (2012) (framing the definition of "good moral character" by
the focusing on what criminal convictions constitute a lack of "good moral character").
204. See id. defining a lack of "good moral character" according to an individual's
criminal offenses).
205. See Castiglia v. INS, 108 F.3d 1101, 1102 (9th Cir. 1997) (denying an application
for naturalization of an Italian Vietnam War veteran based on the presence of a 2nd degree
murder conviction from twenty-three years prior); Petition of Suey Chin, 173 F. Supp. 510,
511 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (denying a World War II veteran's petition for naturalization because
of narcotics use and addiction); Pinet v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 556 F.
Supp. 2d 55, 55 (D.N.H. 2008) (denying an alien's application for naturalization because of
a conviction for use of a communication facility to facilitate a drug transaction); Rico v.
I.N.S., 262 F. Supp. 2d 6, 6 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that an alien's "driving while intoxi-
cated (DWI) conviction, failure to accept responsibility for his past crimes, failure to estab-
lish his claim of rehabilitation, and lack of candor, taken together, precluded a finding of
good moral character in accord with current moral conventions, as required for
naturalization").
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nizable context of former INA Section 212(c), which covers waivers of
past conduct in removal proceedings.20 6
In 1996 came the repeal of INA Section 212 (c) by the Illegal Immigra-
tion Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA).2 07 Formerly,
this section allowed those facing removal proceedings to seek waiver of
their prior convictions based on hardship.2 0 s As the law stands now,
waiver is a virtual impossibility.20 9 Instead of requesting a mere suspen-
sion of the proceedings, as under Section 212(c), the only recourse is to
seek cancellation of the removal proceedings under Section 240(a) which
has a much higher burden of establishing hardship.2 10 Section 212(c) was
repealed during a period of increased anti-immigrant sentiment and the
procedural harshness of Section 240(a) is little understood by the general
public. 2 11 Meanwhile, legal permanent residents, the people punished by
206. See Vergara-Molina v. I.N.S., 956 F.2d 682,684 (7th Cir. 1992) (applying the INA
212(c) balancing test by using the factors in Matter of Marin, 16 1 & N Dec. 581, 1978 WL
36472 (BIA 1978) to consider both the positive and negative acts in the background of the
individual facing removal, and finding that this instance warranted a finding for the state);
Diaz-Resendez v. INS, 960 F.2d 493, 495 (5th Cir. 1992) (mentioning the Matter of Marin
factors specifically and reversing a BIA decision for failing to actually consider positive
factors or favorable evidence in a INA 212(c) removal hearing.); Douglas v. I.N.S., 28 F.3d
241, 243-46 (2d Cir. 1994) (denying a petition for review of BIA decision and holding that
BIA immigration judge adequately considered the petitioner's positive factors before or-
dering his deportation, and citing to the Matter of Marn positive factors).
207. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, § 24013, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-597 (1996).
208. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 414, § 212(c), 66 Stat. 163, 187
(1952).
209. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1) (2006).
210. Podgorny, supra note 163, at 296-297; see Flores Juarez v. Mukasey, 530 F.3d
1020, 1021-22 (9th Cir. 2008) (requiring the petitioner to establish good moral character
for a period of ten years and establish "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship"
before seeking cancellation of removal under 8 USC 1229b); Barco-Sandoval v. Gonzales,
516 F.3d 35, 36 (2d Cir. 2008) (dismissing an alien's petition for review of BIA decision
because the court lacked jurisdiction to review the factual and discretionary findings in the
BIA's decision).
211, William C.B. Underwood, Unreviewable Discretionary Justice: The New Extreme
Hardship in Cancellation of Deportation Cases, 72 INDIANA L.J. 885, 887 (1997).
In recognition of the harsh results that deportation might impose on certain long-term
resident aliens, the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") allowed for the discre-
tionary cancellation of an alien's deportation in cases where it would be an extreme
hardship for the alien to leave the United States. Despite the enormous discretion
vested in agency decision makers" and the erosion of meaningful review," Congress
has drastically curtailed this relief and eliminated a fundamental procedural safeguard
by categorically prohibiting judicial review.' Thus, it appears that Congress has com-
pletely insulated potentially abusive and unconscionable decisions.
Id.
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its provisions, suffer without a voice because of the very nature of their
status.212
In the naturalization context, courts would apply a balancing test of
good and bad acts and to determine if the bad acts could be waived and
thereby allow the alien to remain in the United States.2 13 Admittedly,
there are some differences between these two contexts. First, the good
moral character requirement is a requirement to prove eligibility for citi-
zenship, while the balancing test related to former Section 212(c) was
only applied in removal proceedings.2 1 4 Second, relief under former Sec-
tion 212(c) was discretionary, as the alien was required to prove the exis-
tence of some exceptional hardship,21 s but the mandatory requirement
for good moral character has historically focused on negative behaviors
that disprove its existence. 16
However, the similarities are also striking. Both contexts evaluate a
non-citizen's past (and future worth) by looking at past criminal acts.2 17
Both types of proceedings also adjudicate the status of the individual per-
manently. 218 Applying the balancing test of former Section 212(c), or a
similar one in the good moral character analysis, would correct the injus-
tice of the current jurisprudence as to war veterans.2 1 9 Most foreign ser-
vice members are overwhelmingly legal permanent residents, thus they
likely to have substantial roots here in the United States, including long-
212. Id.
213. See Vergara-Molina v. INS, 956 F.2d 682, 684 (7th Cir. 1992) (illustrating the use
of a balancing test of good and bad acts); Douglas v, INS, 28 F.3d 241, 243-44 (2d Cir.
1994) (utilizing a balancing test of good and bad acts to determine whether cancellation of
removal proceedings was proper).
214. See Woerner, supra note 143, at 12-13 (outlining judicial tests of what constitutes
"good moral character"). See, e.g., Vergara-Molina, 956 F.2d at 684 (utilizing a balancing
test in a removal proceeding).
215. See, e.g., Vergara-Molina, 956 F.2d at 684 (illustrating the use of a balancing test
in determining whether an alien has endured exceptional hardship).
216. See, e.g., Petition of Suey Chin, 173 F. Supp. 510, 510 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (determin-
ing whether "good moral character" exists by focusing on acts that would not constitute
"good moral character").
217. See, e.g., Rico v. INS, 262 F. Supp. 2d 6,6 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding an alien's past
criminal acts an indication of whether he has good moral character); Matter of Marin, 16
I&N Dec. 581, 588, 1978 WL 36472 (BIA 1978) (discussing the impact of past criminal acts
on an application for § 212(c) relief).
218. See, e.g., Rico, 262 F. Supp. 2d at 6 (denying a legal permanent resident's applica-
tion for naturalization based on past criminal acts); Matter of Marin, WL 36472 (denying an
appeal of removal proceedings because the past criminal activity of the applicant out-
weighed any positive effects of granting the appeal).
219. See Pinet v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 556 F. Supp. 2d 55, 56
(D.N.H. 2008) (denying a member of the armed force's application for citizenship under
the "good moral character" analysis); Matter of Marin, 16 I&N Dec. at 588 (outlining the
balancing test used in § 212(c) claims).
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term employment, business and family connections, and property hold-
ings.220 These residents are also likely to have been in the United States
since childhood, making it completely impractical to remove them to a
country where they have no roots and which they have never known as an
adult.2 2 1 While it was possible during the Second World War for a foreign
national "off the boat," as it were, to join our military, it has long since
been a requirement that the potential enlistee be at least a legal perma-
nent resident and the overwhelming majority of foreign service members
hold that status.22 2 The balancing test would correct the injustice by in-
corporating the concrete behaviors of holding steady employment and
serving in the military in addition to the applicant's bad acts.
VI. MATTER OF MARIN'S POSITIVE FACTORS
One case relating to this provision is Matter of Marin in 1978.223 This
Board of Immigration Appeals opinion is significant because it estab-
lished some positive characteristics that were appropriate to examine
alongside the bad acts of the individual facing removal.22 4 While the
Board did not adopt these factors as a formal test,2 2 5 their influence has
been undeniable in immigration decisions, as the "Marin factors" have
been cited to in one form or another in almost 300 case decisions and
over 2,000 briefs and other documents." This group includes every fed-
220. Andrew Becker & Anna Gorman, Many Immigrants Deported for Nonviolent
Crimes, Los ANGELES TIMPs, Apr. 15, 2009, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/apr/15/nation/
na-deporteesl5.
221. Id.
[N]early three-quarters of the roughly 897,000 immigrants deported from 1997 to 2007
after serving criminal sentences were convicted of nonviolent offenses, and one-fifth
were legal permanent residents . . . The law is retroactive, so immigrants are often
deported because of crimes they committed before the law was written . . . The
Human Rights Watch report estimates the deportations have caused the separation of
more than 1 million family members.
Id. See also Julia Preston, Young and Alone, Facing Court and Deportation, N.Y. TIMEs,
Aug. 25, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/26/us/more-young-illegal-immigrants-face-
deportation.html?pagewanted=all ("The rush of young illegal border crossers began last
fall but picked up speed this year, according to official figures. From October through July,
the authorities detained 21,842 unaccompanied minors, most at the Southwest border, a 48
percent increase over a year earlier.").
222. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 414, § 318, 66 Stat. 244, (1952).
223. 16 I&N Dec. 581, 581 1978 WL 36472 (BIA 1978).
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. See INS v. St. Cyr., 533 U.S. 289, 296 (2001); Casalena v. INS, 984 F.2d 105,
106-07 (4th Cir. 1993); De Freitas Noia v. INS, 974 F.2d 1329 (1st Cir. 1992); Diaz-
Resendez v. INS, 960 F.2d 493, 495 (5th Cir. 1992); Douglas v. INS, 28 F.3d 241, 243 (2d
Cir. 1994); Hajiani-Niroumand v. INS, 26 F.3d 832, 835 (8th Cir. 1994); Hazime v. INS, 17
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eral circuit court and the High Court itself."' The case involved a Co-
lombian man who was a lawful permanent resident.2 28 He served thirty
months for criminal sale of cocaine, and after being found deportable he
applied for relief under the former provision 212 (c). 229 The court stated
that it had "not adopted an inflexible test for an immigration judge to use
to determine as a conclusory matter whether Section 212(c) relief should
be granted as a matter of discretion." 230 Instead, the Board outlined sev-
eral adverse factors as well as favorable factors that should be included in
the total balancing process. The negative factors listed include a criminal
past, violation of immigration laws, and "other evidence indicative of a
respondent's bad character or undesirability as a permanent resident of
this country."231 The Board then outlined the positive factors:
Favorable considerations have been found to include such factors as
family ties within the United States, residence of long duration in
this country (particularly when the inception of residence occurred
while the respondent was of young age), evidence of hardship to the
respondent and family if deportation occurs, service in this country's
Armed Forces, a history of employment, the existence of property or
business ties, evidence of value and service to the community, proof
of a genuine rehabilitation if a criminal record exists, and other evi-
dence attesting to a respondent's good character (e.g., affidavits from
family, friends and responsible community representatives).23 2
The Board also required the Immigration Judge to specifically state the
basis for his holding in the opinion.2 33 The Board later clarified that this
F.3d 136, 138 (6th Cir. 1994); Nunez-Pena v. INS, 956 F.2d 223,225 (10th Cir. 1992); Ponce-
Alatorre v. INS, 985 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1993); Procel-Rivera v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 340 F.
App'x 523, 524 (11th Cir. 2009); Tipu v. INS, 20 F.3d 580, 580 (3d Cir. 1994); Vergara-
Molina v. INS, 956 F.2d 682, 684 (7th Cir. 1992).
227. INS v. St. Cyr., 533 U.S. 289, 296 (2001); Casalena v. U.S. INS, 984 F.2d 105,
106-07 (4th Cir. 1993); De Freitas Noia v. INS, 974 F.2d 1329 (1st Cir. 1992); Diaz-
Resendez v. INS, 960 F.2d 493, 495 (5th Cir. 1992); Douglas v. INS, 28 F.3d 241, 243 (2d
Cir. 1994); Hajiani-Niroumand v. INS, 26 F.3d 832, 835 (8th Cir. 1994); Hazime v. INS, 17
F.3d 136,138 (6th Cir. 1994); Nunez-Pena v. INS, 956 F.2d 223, 225 (10th Cir. 1992); Ponce-
Alatorre v. INS, 985 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1993); Procel-Rivera v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 340 F.
App'x 523, 524 (11th Cir. 2009); Tipu v. INS, 20 F.3d 580, 580 (3d Cir. 1994); Vergara-
Molina v. INS, 956 F.2d 682, 684 (7th Cir. 1992).
228. Matter of Marin, 16 I&N Dec. 581, 582 (1978).
229. Id.
230. Id. at 584.
231. Id. at 585.
232. Id.
233. See id. ("Upon review of the record as a whole, the immigration judge is required
to balance the positive and adverse matters to determine whether discretion should be
favorably exercised. The basis for the immigration judge's decision must be enunciated in
his opinion.").
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did not mean that the judge's opinion must address each one of the listed
factors because it did not adopt them as a rigid test.2 34 This creates more
flexibility, as opposed to enumerating a list of crimes, which creates auto-
matic exemption, and subsequently, no flexibility.23 5 The statutory lan-
guage itself also contrasts sharply with the actions of immigration judges
who use the catchall provision in the statute to circumvent the statutorily
defined time periods for proving good moral character and bring in bad
acts occurring in the applicant's distant past.236
The positive Marin factors can be divided into two groups: conduct or
behavior based factors, and circumstantial factors. The first group in-
cludes military service, long-term employment, and existence of property
of business ties.23 7 These factors involve the deliberate and sustained be-
havior of the applicant.2 38 Military service and long-term employment
can both be said to negate bad acts because they require that an applicant
constantly remain within a restricted range of acceptable behavior. For
example, because habitual drunkenness could likely cause someone to
lose a job or be discharged from military service, the presence of a period
of military service or of a long term job suggests, albeit circumstantially,
that the applicant is most likely not a habitual drunkard (also a prohib-
ited status).2  While the standards for behavior in the military both on
and off duty are quite strict compared to most civilian job, even civilian
employers will not put up with employees who are constantly in trouble
with the law, or who have severe substance abuse problems or who are
234. See Matter of Edwards, 20 I&N Dec. 191 (1990) ("In sum, I believe it is the
Board's purpose to provide guidance in the exercise of discretion in these areas but that it
is not the Board's intention to provide a formula that should be rigidly followed.").
235. Matter of Marin, 16 I&N Dec. 581, 584 (1978).
236. Immigration and Nationality Act 101(f), Pub. L. 414, Ch. 477,66 Stat. 172 (1952),
8 U.S.C. 1101 (f) (2006); see lkenokwalu-White v. I.N.S., 316 F.3d 798, 804 (8th Cir. 2003)
(holding that the decisions under the catchall provision are nondiscretionary and
reviewable).
237. Matter of Marin, 16 I&N Dec. at 584-85, (1978).
238. See id. (listing several factors that have been considered in favor of the
applicant).
Favorable considerations have been found to include such factors as family ties within
the United States, residence of long duration in this country (particularly when the
inception of residence occurred while the respondent was of young age), evidence of
hardship to the respondent and family if deportation occurs, service in this country's
Armed Forces, a history of employment, the existence of property or business ties,
evidence of value and service to the community, proof of a genuine rehabilitation if a
criminal record exists, and other evidence attesting to a respondent's good character.
Id.
239. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(1) (2006) (stating that "[no] person shall be regarded as, or
found to be, a person of good moral character who, during the period for which good
moral character is required to be established, is, or was-(1) a habitual drunkard.").
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otherwise involved in crime or vice. 2 4 0 Compare the probative value of
these types of behavior to the conclusory nature of, for example, an affi-
davit from an applicant's grandmother explaining in detail the applicant's
good moral character.
The presence of property or business ties does not prove good moral
character at the same caliber that military service or continued employ-
ment do, but it does prove that the applicant has intentionally cultivated a
financial stake in this country. Those who invest their own limited finan-
cial resources into the American economy by owning property or through
business dealings as discussed by the BIA should be afforded some small
measure of grace for participating in our economy, if for no other reason
than transforming foreign investment into domestic investment. Our his-
tory is replete with examples of corporations and the wealthy receiving
tax breaks and exemptions for investing their money here241' and we
should likewise extend some small relief towards those foreigners of
lesser means who invest their money as well. Such investments are a con-
crete motivation for an applicant to act with good moral character be-
cause holding onto the investment (by remaining in the United States) is
conditioned on obeying the law and staying out of trouble. If the appli-
cant has acted badly in the past, then the investment still represents a
substantial motivation for true rehabilitation, because the applicant al-
ways has an incentive to hang on to his or her money. While this factor
does not relate to foreign-born service members per se, it does illustrate
another example of a behavior-based factor as favored by the Supreme
Court.242
This is in stark contrast to today's jurisprudence, where those who
aren't deported are left permanently in the purgatory between removal
and citizenship. While there are important benefits to being a legal per-
240. See, e.g, Jeremy Korzeniewski, Chrysler Workers Fired for Drinking Back on Job
Against Automaker's Wishes, AuTroBLOG (Dec. 10, 2012, 8:58 AM), http://www.autoblog.
com/2 0 12/12/1 0/chrysler-workers-fired-for-drinking-back-on-job-against-automake/
(describing that the number of employees who drink on the job is not decreasing: "Accord-
ing to Fox 2 News in Detroit, the [thirteen] workers who were fired in 2010 after its cam-
eras caught them drinking alcohol and smoking what [seems] to be marijuana in a park
during work hours have been reinstated following arbitration.").
241. Kay Bell, 5 Unfair Tax Breaks That Should be Eliminated, YAhoo (Dec. 19,
2012, 2:47 PM), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/5-egregious-tax-loopholes-benefit-
080033155.html.
Businesses also get their fair share of tax breaks and tax loopholes. The ability to save
on corporate taxes by shipping operations overseas is one of the most vilified corpo-
rate tax breaks. U.S. businesses get a tax deduction for the costs they incur in relocat-
ing their domestic operations to a foreign location.
Id.
242. Macintosh, 283 U.S. at 605.
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manent resident, these increasingly large numbers of second-rate mem-
bers of society are permanently barred from having any say in the
political process, from holding many types of jobs, and from receiving
many types of government benefits. The worst part is that legal perma-
nent residents are always subject to deportation if they get into
trouble.2 43 A naturalized citizen cannot be deported and only under ex-
treme circumstances can they be denaturalized and potentially removed
to their nation of origin.2 " A common theme among these shortcomings
is that legal permanent residents are many times left with no path to-
wards citizenship and true membership in the community.2 45 While this
injustice is difficult for the entire population of applicants for citizenship,
it is particularly burdensome on combat veterans because they quite liter-
ally may hold in one hand a Department of Defense Form 214 (Certifi-
cate of Release or Discharge from Active Duty) characterizing their
service as honorable,4 and in the other hand an opinion from an immi-
gration judge stating that a finding of good moral character is improper.
VII. THE NEED FOR A FRAMEWORK TO ANALYZE
THE GOOD ACTs OF APPLICANTS
The other category of the positive Matter of Marin factors is decidedly
less probative of good moral character because they consist merely of
bare associations with the United States or of conclusory statements of
good moral character. This kind of evidence does not contain much pro-
bative value because it either proves nothing other than an applicant's
physical presence or that of their family, or comes from a biased or self-
interested source. For example, the simple fact of family ties within the
United States does not prove that an applicant has a particularly moral or
well-behaved family but rather it only proves the geographical location of
the applicant's family. While keeping families together is a noble and
243. Agence France-Presse, Supreme Court Considers Rights of U.S. Permanent Re-
sidents, Tim RAw SroiRY (Jan. 18, 2012, 7:54 PM), http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2012/01/18/
top-court-considers-rights-of-u-s-permanent-residents/.
The US government has been deporting record numbers of non-citizens-nearly
400,000 a year since 2009, according to the Department of Homeland Security-and
legal challenges to these removals have been on the rise ... . Under US law, legal
permanent residents that hold 'green cards' can live and work in the United States
with few restraints, but can be deported under certain circumstances.
Id.
244. See United States v. Kairys, 782 F.2d 1374, 1376-77 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding pro-
ceedings for revocation of naturalization for lying about working in a Nazi labor camp
valid).
245. Id.
246. Discharge Papers and Separation Documents, AicHUvE-s, http://www.archives.
gov/st-louis/military-personnel/dd-214.htmi.
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worthy goal, it does not establish the character of those seeking citizen-
ship. Likewise, residence of long duration in this country only suggests
just what it states, but rather only that the applicant was physically pre-
sent. Additionally, providing the court with affidavits from family mem-
bers or friends does not serve as objective evidence of good behavior.
While many applicants might find such affidavits convincing, they are al-
most invariably obtained from those who have a clear bias toward the
applicant's admission, perhaps even a pecuniary interest in it, and in most
other settings such affidavits would constitute inadmissible character evi-
dence.24 7 An obvious exemption to this general rule should pertain to
those who come here by various means as children through no fault of
their own and know no other country as a home.2 48 It is certainly unjust
to send those persons back to a country that they may have known only
in their youth. While much litigation and controversy surrounds proving
up evidence of hardship to the respondent and family if deportation oc-
curs,2" 9 the hardship analysis always requires the court to engage in a fact
specific analysis of each case. Thus, as a group, this particular category is
not a good barometer of good moral character because each case is vastly
different. How can one person's emergency or hardship be weighed
against another? How can any one of these situations demonstrate a per-
son's good moral character as opposed to another? Likewise, the demon-
247. FEDERAL EvIDENcE REVIEw, FEDERAL Ruus oif EviENcIE 2012, 18-19, 26,
(2006).
248. Adriane Meneses, The Deportation of Lawful Permanent Residents for Old and
Minor Crimes: Restoring Judicial Review, Ending Retroactivity, and Recognizing Deporta-
tion As Punishment, 14 SCHOLAR 767, 820 (2012).
Although reportedly less common than the deportation of alien veterans and alien
service members, foreign-born children adopted from abroad face deportation in cases
where their naturalization was never completed by their adoptive parents. . When
these adopted lawful permanent residents are convicted of deportable offenses, a lack
of available discretion on the part of trial judges or immigration judges renders their
removal mandatory-often to countries they cannot remember and where they have
no known family.
Id.; see also Satya Grace Kaskade, Mothers Without Borders: Undocumented Immigrant
Mothers Facing Deportation and the Best Interests of Their U.S. Citizen Children, 15 WM. &
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 447, 451 (2009) (discussing how deportation of immigrant parents
affects citizen-children born in the United States).
249. Jennifer Lindsley, All Relevant Factors: Gender in the Analysis of Exceptional
and Extremely Unusual Hardship, 19 Wis. WOMEN's L.J. 337, 339 (2004); see also Marcia
Zug, Deporting Grandma: Why Grandparent Deportation May Be the Next Big Immigra-
tion Crisis and How to Solve It, 43 U.C. DAVis L. REV. 193,207-08 (2009); see also Patricia
Dysart Rudloff, In Re Oluloro: Risk of Female Genital Mutilation As "Extreme Hardship"
in Immigration Proceedings, 26 Sr. MARY's L.J. 877,886-87 (1995); Susan L. Kamlet, Judi-
cial Review of "Extreme Hardship' in Suspension of Deportation Cases, 34 AM. U. L. Ray.
175, 176 (1984); V. the Procedural Rights of Deportable Aliens, 96 HARV. L. Rev. 1370,
1386 (1983); Underwood, supra note 211, at 900.
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stration of value and service to the community, proof of a genuine
rehabilitation for criminals, and other evidence like affidavits from
friends, family, and community members all suffer from the same flaw of
requiring copious amounts of context to demonstrate anything good or
bad. This is a disadvantage because it requires a much greater amount of
work on behalf of the court and does not generate a set of elements or
guidelines for the court to use in that work because each instance is com-
pletely unique. While such humanitarian situations should not be over-
looked, they simply make a bad framework for beginning the discussion
of how to analyze good acts in the good moral character analysis.
When compared to the second category of Marin factors, the first is
more useful as a measuring stick because it consists of documented long-
standing patterns of behavior that tend to disprove other types of bad
behavior. This creates a solution to bridge the gap and serve both inter-
ests. This is important because the government does have an interest in
encouraging naturalization, which allows them to justify discriminating
against non-citizens.2o This is the same interest that prompted the good
moral character requirement to be adopted over two hundred years
ago.2 51 It goes without saying that the government does have a substan-
tial interest in ensuring that applicants for citizenship are not criminals
and that they have the requisite good moral character to participate in
our society. Additionally, the actions in the first category are comparable
to one another, meaning that they can be used as a standard as opposed
to contextual evidence or other character evidence that can only be
judged on a case-by-case basis. For example, the service of a male who
served honorably during the Vietnam War is quite comparable to the ser-
vice of a female who served during combat in Iraq. Even though the their
service took place in vastly different places and years apart, one can still
draw the same conclusions about their behavior as long as their time in
the military was characterized as honorable upon separation or retire-
ment. This logic also holds true in the long-term employment context
because such employment establishes a pattern of good behavior. Long-
term employment proves stability and an ability to work in an environ-
ment with other individuals.2 " A construction worker and a doctor lead
strikingly different lives while pursuing their trade each day and have
highly different qualifications, but they also both meet some very impor-
tant basic requirements of almost all jobs-and both can be fired if they
do not continually meet them. These requirements include things like
showing up on time every day, meeting basic deadlines, meeting basic
250. Lapp, supra note 36, at 1583.
251. Id.
252. Matter of Marin, 16 I&N Dec. 581, 584-85, (1978).
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goals for performance, and reliability in showing up every day. They re-
flect that both white-collar and blue-collar workers meet some of the
same behavior standards.
While it appears logical to include such good acts in an analysis for
good moral character, the vast majority of cases never consider the appli-
cant's good acts in a meaningful way. 25 3 Those that even mention good
factors usually summarily reject those factors as unable to rehabilitate an
applicant from the statutorily prohibited conduct.25 4 in essence, these be-
havior-based categories should be given more weight in the analysis of
positive factors in the good moral character context because they can
convincingly outweigh the presence of isolated non-violent bad acts. The
government has two substantial interests in this context: the interest in
ensuring the quality of applicants for citizenship, and the interest in main-
taining the due process guarantees of the Constitution while doing so.
VIII. CONCLUsION
Immigration reform is among the most contentious domestic issues of
any recent election. While many would agree that the current system of
good moral character analysis and the engorged list of aggravated felo-
nies are far too draconian, few can agree on any alternative. This Com-
ment suggests that the old balancing test from former Section 212(c) be
applied to the context of naturalization for war veterans, not only for
their benefit, but to articulate a framework for analyzing positive behav-
iors of the applicant. This is because foreign-born service members are a
253. See Castiglia v. INS, 108 F.3d 1101, 1102 (9th Cir. 1997); Petition of Suey Chin,
173 F. Supp. 510, 511 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Pinet v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 556
F. Supp. 2d 55, 55 (D.N.H. 2008); Rico v. INS, 262 F. Supp. 2d 6, 6 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (hold-
ing that an alien's "driving while intoxicated (DWI) conviction, failure to accept responsi-
bility for his past crimes, failure to establish his claim of rehabilitation, and lack of candor,
taken together, precluded a finding of good moral character in accord with current moral
conventions, as required for naturalization"); Toolasprashad v. Schult, No. 10-CV-1050
(LEK/DRH), 2011 U.S. Dist. WL 3157297, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 2011) report and rec-
ommendation adopted, No. 10-CV-1050 (LEK/DRH), 2011 WL 3157290 (N.D.N.Y. July 26,
2011) (denying a writ of habeas corpus and denying a petition for naturalization of an
Army veteran from Guyana because of his guilty plea to aiding and abetting of a murder).
254. See generally Matter of Marin, 16 I&N Dec. 581 (1978) (stating that favorable
factors will not result in rehabilitation of the applicant).
We find no merit to the challenge to the other considerations cited by the immigration
judge in reaching his decision on the exercise of discretion (e.g., the presence of a
brother and sister in Colombia; the absence of a showing of unusual "hardships" if
deported) for the same reasons noted above. Each factor cited was relevant to the
issue of whether discretion should be favorably exercised, and each was considered by
the immigration judge in the context of finding that the respondent had failed to come
forward with sufficient equities to offset the significant unfavorable evidence.
Id, at 587.
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discrete group, and because their major positive factor (military service
during wartime) enables courts to analyze them as unified group instead
of subjectively comparing one individual's personal hardship to another.
Additionally, one of the fastest growing minority populations in the
United States is the Hispanic community2 5 5 and, as stated earlier, the two
largest groups of foreign service-members come from Mexico and the
Philippines. Therefore, applying the balancing test to war veterans would
also benefit the largest minority group in the wider pool of applicants as
well. By applying this balancing test to combat veterans, the public
would gain the benefits of a logical and balanced approach to evaluating
applicants for citizenship, and veterans would benefit by receiving the
proper respect for their heroic sacrifice. Two other important goals can
be accomplished simultaneously by making this change. The first is that
the government's substantial interest in vetting applicants for citizenship
would remain unhindered. The second interest preserved is that of for-
eign-born service members in having an accessible path to citizenship
through military service to our country.
While this article is not meant to critique the standards for joining the
military, it is an analysis on the disparity between the standards to enlist
(and wind up being sent to a presidentially designated hostile-fire zone),
and the standards to become a citizen when those standards include at-
tachment to the principles of the Constitution and good moral character.
One who pledges to, and actually does, defend out nation under the re-
quirements of the enlistment standards establishes prima facie their com-
pliance with the naturalization standards.
This piece is also a critique on the labeling of non-violent, unarmed
crimes as "aggravated." Closely related is the flaw of inserting too many
criminal standards into the civil jurisprudence relating to naturalization
and the analysis of good moral character. Instead of relying solely on
negative actions to define this important concept, the analysis should in-
corporate behavior-based measures of good acts and weigh those against
the applicant's past crimes. Applicants will still be barred for their past
acts of violence, but their service will be able to rehabilitate the presence
255. See Stephanie Sick, Census: Hispanics are 'the most populous' and 'fastest grow-
ing minority group', NEws CHIANNEiL 5 WPTV (May 17, 2012), http://www.wptv.com/dpp/
news/national/census-hispanics-are-the-most-populous-and-fastest-growing-minority-group
(stating that Hispanics is the minority group with greatest growth).
The figures[-]which defines 'minority' as anyone who does not identify themselves as
white (as a single race) and non-Hispanic[-count Hispanics as 'the most populous'
and 'fasting growing minority group.' They numbered [fifty-two] million in 2011, and
their population grew by 3.1 [percent] since 2010. The U.S. Hispanic population grew
from 16.3 [percent] in 2010 to 16.7 [percent] in 2011.
Id.
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of other crimes and we will be able to bring these brave and honorable
men and women fully into our American community. The sacrifice they
make on behalf of our nation is clearly worthy of bestowing such an
honor on them, and our long history of caring for our veterans demands
that we take such action.
Finally, when contemplating who these service members really are and
what they really add to our nation, remember the story of Lt. Col (Ret.)
Alfred Rascon of the U.S. Army. His extraordinary story started when
he was born in Chihuahua, Mexico in 1945.256 His family immigrated to
California when he was a boy and he joined the U.S. Army out of high
school.2 57 During his first tour in Vietnam, when his platoon was pinned
down by the enemy, then Specialist Rascon, a medic, crawled forward of
the front lines to rescue several wounded comrades under heavy fire.2 5 8
Rascon repeatedly exposed himself to blistering enemy fire and actually
shielded his fellow soldiers from grenades with his own body and saving
two of their lives in the process.25 9 He was so badly wounded that he was
given his last rites, but miraculously he survived. 2 6 0 He went on to serve
another tour in Vietnam and in 1967 he became a naturalized U.S.
citizen.26'
Rascon's recommendation for the Medal of Honor got lost, however in
1993 several of the men who were saved by Rascon asked that his file be
reopened.262 After realizing that he had not been properly recognized,
they banded together and were able to get his citation packet before
President Bill Clinton.263 The President was able to work with the Penta-
gon to complete Rascon's packet and in February of 2000, he actually
received the Medal of Honor, our nation's highest award for bravery in
combat. 264 After this he went on to head up the nation's Selective Ser-
vice System.2 5 He even went further and rejoined the Army to serve
256. Alfred Rascon, MEDAL OF HONOR SPEAKOUT, http://www.medalofhonor-
speakout.org/bio/alfred-rascon (last visited Dec. 24, 2012).
257. Id.
258. Chris Carter, Alfred V. Rascon Medal of Honor citation, VICTORY INSTrIrowI,
http://www.victoryinstitute.net/blogs/utb/2000/03/16/alfred-v-rascon-medal-of-honor-cita-
tion/ (last visited Dec. 24, 2012).
259. Id.
260. Alfred Rascon, MEDAL OF HONOR SPEAKOUT, supra note 256.
261. Muphen R. Whitney, Medal of Honor Recipient Speaks at Fort Detrick, DCMII-
TARY.COM, (Apr. 10, 2008), http://ww2.demilitary.com/stories/041008/standard28234.
shtml.
262. Alfred Rascon, MEDAL OF HONoR SPEAKOUT, supra note 256.
263. Id.
264. Muphen R. Whitney, supra note 261.
265. Id.
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tours in Iraq and Afghanistan in the medical corps.2 6 6 While addressing
the Senate in 1999 Rascon said that:
[T]he Army provided me with an opportunity to serve my adopted
country. Above all it gave me the opportunity to give something of
myself to this great nation. I was once asked by a reporter why, as a
non-citizen of the United States, I volunteered to join the military
and serve in Vietnam. I answered, 'I was always an American in my
heart. '267
266. Id.
267. Id
650 [Vol. 15:603
